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Abstract
How important is the risk-taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, 
we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose 
excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem which distorts banks’ incentives. 
As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive 
risk taking increases, lowering the effi ciency of investment. We show that this novel 
transmission channel generates a new and quantitatively signifi cant monetary policy trade-off 
between infl ation and real interest rate stabilization: it is optimal for the central bank to 
tolerate greater infl ation volatility in exchange for lower risk taking.
Keywords: bank risk, monetary policy, DSGE models.
JEL classifi cation: E12, E44, E58.
Resumen
¿Cuánto importa el canal de toma de riesgos (risk-taking channel) para la política monetaria? 
Para responder a esta pregunta, desarrollamos y estimamos un modelo cuantitativo 
macroeconómico DSGE, en el que los bancos eligen inversiones excesivamente arriesgadas, 
debido a un problema de agencia que distorsiona los incentivos de los bancos. Cuando 
el tipo de interés real baja, el peso de esas distorsiones aumenta y los bancos toman más 
riesgos, lo cual tiene un impacto negativo sobre la efi ciencia de sus inversiones. Demostramos 
que este nuevo canal de transmisión genera un nuevo y cuantitativamente signifi cativo 
trade-off entre la estabilización de la infl ación y los tipos de interés: para el banco central 
resulta deseable aceptar más volatilidad de infl ación a cambio de menos toma de riesgos.
Palabras clave: riesgo bancario, política monetaria, modelos DSGE.
Códigos JEL: E12, E44, E58.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has sparked a debate about the influence of monetary
policy on the risk-taking behavior of the banking sector. A number of recent stud-
ies such as Jimenez et al. (2014) show that low interest rates increase the risk
appetite of banks, creating an additional channel of monetary policy transmission,
known as the risk-taking channel.1 Though there has been much discussion of the
risk-taking channel amongst policy makers in recent years,2 its general-equilibrium
and optimal monetary-policy implications remain unclear. Answering these ques-
tions requires a quantitative model which is consistent with both the evidence
on the risk-taking channel and with conventional views about monetary policy.
Our contribution is to build and estimate a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE
model, where monetary policy influences bank risk taking, which in turn affects
the real economy. Furthermore, we provide analytical results which show how the
inefficiency of risk taking depends on the volatility of the real interest rate, imply-
ing a motive for the policy maker to stabilize the real interest rate, at the cost of
greater inflation volatility. This constitutes a new trade-off that influences optimal
monetary policy in a quantitatively significant way.
In our model banks raise funds through deposit and equity, which they then use
to invest in risky capital projects. In particular, banks choose from a continuum
of investment projects, each defined by different risk-return characteristics. Every
project has a certain probability of being successful and yielding capital in the next
period. However, the safer the project, the lower the return in the event of success.
As in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), we assume that depositors cannot observe the in-
vestment risk choice and that bank owners are protected by limited liability. These
two assumptions create an agency problem: banks are partially isolated from the
downside risk of their investment and choose a risk level that is socially excessive.3
The agency problem could be mitigated if bankers held more equity. Yet, banks
1This term was first used by Borio and Zhu (2008).
2See, for instance, New York Times, ’Fed officially concedes risk of low rates but signals
no shift’, 11.10.2010, Financial Times, ’Draghi warns central banks against blind risk taking’,
14.5.2015, Bloomberg Business, ’Carney says QE can encourage excessive risk taking in financial
markets’, 25.1.2015.
3By socially excessive we mean that it exceeds the risk level that would be chosen, if no
friction were present.
rely on both types of funding because equity is relatively more costly than deposits
due to deposit insurance and a friction in the equity market. A lower risk-free rate
increases the relative cost advantage of deposits. Banks respond by levering up
and choosing riskier investment projects. This higher risk implies a lower average
efficiency of investment, which leads to a decline in the capital stock. Our model
hence generates a new transmission channel through which monetary policy af-
fects the real economy. This channel dampens the positive effects of expansionary
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monetary policy, as reductions in the interest rate exacerbate the financial market
distortions and their implied inefficiency. We validate the quantitative implications
of the model by estimating it on US data. Posterior odds show that the inclusion
of the risk-taking channel improves the in-sample fit for nonfinancial variables.
At the same time our model predicts a path of risk taking that matches survey
evidence on the riskiness of newly issued loans from the Fed Survey of Terms of
Business Lending.
We use the model to analyze the normative implications of the risk-taking
channel for monetary policy, and their quantitative importance in terms of con-
sumer welfare. First we show how the risk-taking channel generates a new trade-off
between inflation stabilization, the objective arising from price stickiness in New
Keynesian models, and interest rate stabilization, a new objective which arises from
the risk-taking channel. As we demonstrate theoretically, the volatility of the real
interest rate decreases the average efficiency of the banks’ risk choice. Hence, by
stabilizing the real interest rate the central bank can ameliorate the inefficiency in
the financial sector. This however requires more muted responses of the interest
rate to inflation deviations. Thus, stabilizing banking sector fluctuations comes at
the expense of allowing greater inflation volatility.
Moreover, we show that this new objective alters optimal policy in a quantita-
tively significant way. Using optimal simple rules, we find that the central bank
optimally accepts around 50% more inflation volatility relative to the case without
the risk-taking channel, in return for a more stable real interest rate. Furthermore,
ignoring the risk-taking channel comes at a welfare cost equivalent to a 0.5-1.0%
loss in lifetime consumption. These results complement existing findings for other
general-equilibrium models with financial frictions such as De Fiore and Tristani
(2013) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001), where optimal policy remains close to
full price stability even if financial frictions are introduced. In particular, De Fiore
and Tristani (2013) characterize Ramsey policy in a small New Keynesian set-up
with credit frictions, where firms borrow in advance to pay wages, and where de-
fault risk and costly monitoring generate a spread between the loan rate and the
risk-free rate. The authors show that the presence of credit frictions augments the
otherwise standard second-order approximation of the welfare function with one
additional term: i.e. that interest-rate and credit-spread volatility directly influ-
ence welfare. However, this additional term is found to be quantitatively small, so
that optimal policy does not substantially deviate from price stability.
Our work relates to a growing theoretical literature that links monetary policy
to financial sector risk in a general-equilibrium framework. Yet, several features
distinguish our work from existing ones. First, motivated by the evidence reviewed
above, it is the first to explicitly model the effect of monetary policy on the riskiness
of banks’ assets and its macroeconomic effects. Second, we show theoretically
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how the risk-taking channel generates a new significant trade-off for the monetary
policy authority. Most of the existing literature explores risk on the funding side
of banks’ balance sheets, associating risk with increased leverage. For instance,
several models build on the financial accelerator framework of Bernanke et al.
(1999).4 The mechanism in these models relies on the buffer role of equity, and
therefore leverage is found to be counter-cyclical with respect to the balance sheet
size. Our model, by contrast, gives rise to pro-cyclical leverage, which is in line
with the empirical evidence reported in Adrian and Shin (2014) and Adrian et al.
(2015). Another example is Angeloni and Faia (2013) and Angeloni et al. (2015),
where lower interest rates translate into a higher bank leverage, and a higher
fraction of inefficient bank runs. Asset risk, on the other hand, has so far mainly
been discussed in the literature on optimal regulation such as Christensen et al.
(2011) and Collard et al. (2012). In these papers, however, either the depositors
or the financial regulator ensure that risk is always chosen optimally, so monetary
policy has no influence on risk taking.5 In contrast to the previous two papers, we
4For example, in Gertler et al. (2012) and de Groot (2014) a monetary expansion increases
banking sector leverage, which in turn amplifies the financial accelerator and strengthens the
propagation of shocks to the real economy.
5Both papers feature ad-hoc extensions that relate risk to the amount of lending and hence
indirectly to monetary policy.
provide micro-foundations for the asset risk-taking channel and focus on monetary
policy while abstracting from regulation.6
Our model of the asset risk-taking channel explains two stylized facts doc-
umented by recent empirical evidence. First, low interest rates cause banks to
make riskier investments. Using micro data from the Spanish Credit Register,
Jimenez et al. (2014) find that lower interest rates induce banks to make relatively
more loans to firms that qualify as risky ex ante as well as ex post.7 Second, the
increase in risk taking is not fully compensated for by higher risk premia on loans,
as shown by Buch et al. (2014) and Ioannidou et al. (2014). As a consequence, the
expected return on banks’ investment decreases, as risk increases in response to
lower interest rates. Moreover, the model posits that the banks’ asset risk choice is
determined by the level of leverage, rather than the quantity of loans: a modeling
choice which is in line with the findings of Ioannidou et al. (2014) and Jimenez
et al. (2014).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop a DSGE model of
the asset risk-taking channel. Section 3 presents the results from the estimation
of the model and discusses the dynamic implications of bank risk taking. Section
4 analyzes how monetary policy should be conducted if the risk-taking channel is
present, and Section 5 concludes.
6One could reinterpret our model as applying to an economy where regulation is unable to
fully control risk taking.
7This finding is confirmed by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2013), Angeloni et al. (2015), Afanasyeva
and Guentner (2015) and Buch et al. (2014) for the US and by Ioannidou et al. (2014) for Bolivia.
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2 A Dynamic New Keynesian model with a bank
risk-taking channel
We build a general-equilibrium model where competitive banks obtain funds from
depositors and equity holders, and invest them into capital projects executed by
capital producers. Every bank chooses its investment from a continuum of tech-
nologies, each defined by a given risk-return characteristic. The risk choice of the
bank is distorted by an agency problem and affected by the level of the real interest
rate. This model reproduces two features found in the data: risk taking depends
8In our notation the time index refers to the period when a variable is determined.
on the contemporaneous interest rate and is not fully reflected in risk premia. The
non-financial sectors of the economy feature standard elements as in Smets and
Wouters (2007), and are therefore sketched only briefly here. More details on the
standard sectors and the complete set of equations characterizing the model can
be found in Appendix B.
2.1 Households
The representative household chooses consumption ct, working hours Lt and sav-
ings in order to maximize its discounted lifetime utility. Saving is possible through
three instruments: government bonds st, which pay the safe gross nominal inter-
est rate Rt, deposit funds dt, and bank equity funds et. The two funds enable
the household to invest into the banking sector, and pay an uncertain nominal
return of Rd,t+1 and Re,t+1.
8 Maximization of his lifetime utility (see Appendix B)
yields the usual labor supply condition, the Euler equation, and two no-arbitrage
conditions:
Et
[
Λt+1
Rd,t+1
πt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
, (1)
Et
[
Λt+1
Re,t+1
πt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
, (2)
where Λt is the marginal utility of consumption.
2.2 Equity and deposit funds
As we explain in detail below, there is a continuum of banks which intermediate
the households’ savings using deposits and equity. Each bank is subject to a binary
idiosyncratic shock which makes a bank fail with probability 1 − qt−1, in which
case equity is wiped out completely and depositors receive partial compensation
from the deposit insurance scheme. We assume that households invest into bank
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equity and deposits through two funds, which diversify away the idiosyncratic bank
default risk by investing into all banks.9
9Focusing on idiosyncratic risk is a simplification that keeps the model tractable. In a pre-
vious version of this paper we considered an extension where the default rate is stochastic and
The deposit fund works without frictions, and represents the depositors’ inter-
ests perfectly. It raises money from the households and invests it into dt units of
deposits.10 In the next period, the fund receives the nominal deposit rate rd,t from
each bank that does not fail. Deposits of failing banks are partially covered by
deposit insurance. Most deposit insurance schemes around the world, including
the US, guarantee all deposits up to a certain maximum amount per depositor.11
We model this capped insurance scheme by assuming that the deposit insurance
guarantees deposits up to a fraction ψ of total bank liabilities et + dt.
12 We as-
sume that the deposit insurance cap is inflation-adjusted, to avoid complicating
the monetary policy trade-off by allowing an interdependence between monetary
policy and deposit insurance. As we will show later, the deposit insurance cap
is always binding in equilibrium, i.e. the bank’s liabilities exceed the cap of the
insurance rd,tdt > ψ(dt + et)πt+1. Defining the equity ratio kt =
et
dt+et
, the deposit
fund therefore receives a real return of ψ/(1 − kt) per unit of deposits from each
defaulting bank at t. The deposit fund hence pays a nominal return of:
Rd,t+1 ≡ qtrd,t + (1− qt) ψ
1− ktπt+1 . (3)
Unlike the deposit fund, the equity fund is subject to a simple agency prob-
lem.13 In particular, we assume that the fund manager faces two options. He
can behave diligently and use the funds raised at t to invest into et units of bank
equity. A fraction qt of banks pay back a return of re,t+1 next period, while de-
faulting banks pay nothing. Alternatively, the fund manager can abscond with the
funds and consume a fraction ξt in the subsequent period, while the rest is lost. To
prevent the fund manager from doing so, the equity providers promise to pay him
its volatility increasing in the idiosyncratic risk choice. We found that this strengthened the
quantitative implications for monetary policy that we discuss below.
10We use deposits to refer to both units of deposit funds and units of bank deposits since they
are equal. We do the same for equity.
11For a comprehensive documentation see, for instance, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2005).
12We introduce deposit insurance to be able to explain the high levels of bank leverage prevalent
in the data. For further discussion of the deposit insurance modeling choices, see footnote 36.
13Households are assumed not to be able invest into bank equity other than through the equity
fund, as they may be to small to be able to diversify their investment effectively, or as they may
lack the information on how to manage equity investment effectively). This ensures that the
friction at the equity fund generates the excess equity premium.
a premium pt at time t + 1 conditional on not absconding. Equity providers pay
the minimal premium that induces diligent behavior, i.e. pt = ξtet. This premium
is rebated to the household in a lump-sum fashion. Once absconding is ruled out
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in equilibrium, the equity fund manager perfectly represents the interests of the
equity providers. The equity fund hence pays the return on bank equity net of the
premium:
Re,t+1 ≡ qtre,t+1 − ξtπt+1 . (4)
We allow the equity premium ξt to vary over time.
14 Since bank equity is the
residual income claimant, the return on the equity fund is affected by all types of
aggregate risk that influences the return of surviving banks.
The two financial distortions introduced so far have important implications.
The agency problem implies an (excess) equity premium, i.e. a premium of the
risk-adjusted return on equity over the risk-free rate. Deposit insurance, on the
other hand, acts as a subsidy on deposits, which implies a discount on the risk-
adjusted return on deposits. As explained below, the difference in the costs of
these two funding types induces a meaningful trade-off between bank equity and
bank deposits under limited liability.
2.3 Capital producers
We assume that the capital production process is risky in a way that nests the
standard capital production process in the New Keynesian model. In particular,
capital is produced by a continuum of capital producers indexed by m. At period
t they invest imt units of final good into a capital project of size o
m
t . This project is
successful with probability qmt , in which case the project yields (ω1− ω22 qmt )omt units
of capital at t+1. Otherwise, the project fails and only the liquidation value of θomt
units of capital can be recovered (where θ  ω1 − ω22 qmt ). Each capital producer
has access to a continuum of technologies with different risk-return characteristics
indexed by qm ∈ [0, 1]. Given a certain technology qmt , the output of producer m
14This shock, driving a wedge between deposit and safe rates on one hand, and equity rates
on the other, is similar to the risk premium shock often found in medium-scale DSGE models
(e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007)). Like all shocks in the model, it follows a standard lognormal
AR(1) process.
is therefore:
Kmt =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
ω1 − ω22 qmt
)
omt with probablity q
m
t
θomt else
This implies that the safer the technology (higher qmt ), the lower is output in the
event of success.
Each bank orders one capital project, and requires the capital producer to use
a certain technology, but this choice cannot be observed by any third party. Given
the technology choice qt, and assuming that the projects of individual producers
are uncorrelated, we can exploit the law of large numbers to derive aggregate
capital:
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Kt = ot
(
qt
(
ω1 − ω2
2
qt
)
+ (1− qt)θ
)
. (5)
Furthermore we assume that capital, which depreciates at rate δ, becomes a
project (of undefined qt) at the end of every period. That is, existing capital may
be destroyed due to unsuccessful reuse, and it can be reused under a different
technology than it was originally produced.15
The total supply of capital projects by the capital producers is the sum of
the existing capital projects ooldt = (1 − δ)Kt−1, which they purchase from the
owners (the banks) at the real price Qt, and the newly created projects o
new
t ,
which are created by investing it units of the final good. We allow for investment
adjustment costs and investment efficiency shocks, i.e. we assume that it units
of investment yield εIt (1− S(it/it−1)) units of project, where S = κ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
.
Hence ot = o
new
t +o
old
t and o
new
t = ε
I
t
(
1− S
(
it
it−1
))
it. Capital producers maximize
their expected discounted profits taking as given the price Qt and the household’s
stochastic discount factor:16
maxit,ooldt Et
∞∑
0
βtΛt
[
Qtε
I
t
(
1− S
(
it
it−1
))
it +Qto
old
t − it −Qtooldt
]
.
15This assumption ensures that we do not have to keep track of the distribution of different
project types. Think of a project as a machine yielding capital services, which can be run at
different speeds (levels of risk). In case it is run at a higher speed, the probability of an accident
destroying the machine is higher. After each period the existing machines are overhauled by the
capital producers and at this point the speed setting can be changed.
16Their out-of-steady-state profits are rebated lump sum to the household.
While the old capital projects are always reused, the marginal capital project is
always a new one.17 Hence, the price of projects Qt is determined by new projects
according to the well known Tobin’s q equation:
Qtε
I
t
[
1− S
(
it
it−1
)
− S ′
(
it
it−1
)
it
it−1
]
−1 = βEt
[
Λt+1
Λt
εIt+1Qt+1S
′
(
it+1
it
)(
it+1
it
)2]
.
(6)
Note that our model of risky capital production boils down to the standard
riskless setting of the New Keynesian model if we fix qt = q¯ and choose parameters
such that qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
+ (1− qt)θ = 1.
2.4 The Bank
The bank is the central agent of our model: it raises resources through deposits and
equity and invests them into a risky project. As in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), an
agency problem arises between banks and depositors when choosing the risk level,
since depositors cannot observe the banks’ risk choice and banks are protected
17We abstract from a non-negativity constraint on new projects.
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since depositors cannot observe the banks’ risk choice and banks are protected
by limited liability. The less equity a bank has, the higher the incentives for risk
taking. Yet, since deposit insurance and the equity premium drive a wedge between
the costs of deposits and equity, the banks’ optimal capital structure comprises
both equity and deposits, balancing the agency problem associated with deposits
with the higher costs of equity. We will show that the equilibrium risk chosen
by the banks is excessive, and that the interest rate influences the degree of its
excessiveness.
We assume that there is a continuum of banks which behave competitively so
that there is a representative bank (we therefore omit the bank’s index in what
follows). The bank is owned by the equity providers, and hence maximizes the
expected discounted value of profits18 using the household’s stochastic discount
factor. Every period, the bank optimally chooses its liability structure by raising
deposits dt and equity et from the respective funds. These resources are then
invested into ot capital projects, purchased at price Qt. When investing into capital
projects, the bank chooses the risk characteristic qt of the technology applied by the
g y j
18Profits in excess of the opportunity costs of equity.
capital producer. This risk choice is not observable for depositors. Each bank can
only invest into one project and hence faces investment risk:19 with probability qt
the bank receives a high payoff from the capital project; with probability 1−qt the
investment fails and yields only the liquidation value. Assuming a sufficiently low
liquidation value θ, a failed project implies the default of the bank. In this case,
given limited liability, equity providers get nothing and depositors get the deposit
insurance benefit. In case of success the bank can repay its investors: depositors
receive their promised return rd,t and equity providers get the state-contingent
return re,t+1.
19The assumption that the bank can only invest into one project and cannot diversify the
project risk might sound stark. Yet three clarifications are in place: First, our set up is isomorphic
to a model where the bank invests into an optimally diversified portfolio of investments but is
too small to perfectly diversify its portfolio. The binary payoff is then to be interpreted as the
portfolio’s expected payoff conditional on default or repayment respectively. Second, if the bank
could choose the degree of diversification (at stage 2 of the problem laid out below), but this choice
were unobservable for the depositor, then the bank would have an incentive to choose minimal
diversification in order to maximize the option value of default. We thank a referee for pointing
this out. Third, we don’t allow the bank to buy the government bond. Yet this assumption is
innocuous: since the banks demand a higher return on investment than the households due to
the equity premium, banks wouldn’t purchase the safe asset even if they could.
20Our setup deviates from Modigliani-Miller in three dimensions. The unobservable risk choice
at stage 2, the (excess) equity premium ξ and deposit insurance all imply that the capital struc-
ture is relevant for the funding costs of the bank. In the absence of the three aforementioned
frictions, the irrelevance theorem would hold. Even then the safe interest rate rd,t would be
smaller than the expected risky equity rate E [re,t+1] to compensate for the risk involved. How-
ever the total funding costs would be independent of the capital structure. The excess equity
premium ξ hence is that part of the total equity premium, which cannot be explained by risk
aversion.
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It is useful to think of the bank’s problem as a recursive two-stage problem. At
the second stage, the bank chooses the optimal risk level qt given a certain capital
structure and a certain cost of deposits. At the first stage, the bank chooses the
optimal capital structure, anticipating the implied solution for the second-stage
problem.20 Note that not only the bank but also the bank’s financiers anticipate
the second-stage risk choice and price deposits and equity accordingly, which is
understood by the bank.
Before we derive the solution for this recursive problem, we establish the bank’s
objective function. Per dollar of nominal funds raised in period t the bank pur-
chases 1/ (QtPt) units of the capital project from the capital producer, choosing
a certain riskiness qt. If the project is successful it turns into (ω1 − ω22 qt)/(QtPt)
capital goods. In the next period t + 1, the bank rents the capital to the firm,
which pays the real rental rate rk,t+1 per unit of capital. Furthermore the bank
receives the depreciated capital, which becomes a capital project again, with a
real value of (1− δ)Qt+1 per unit of capital. The bank’s total nominal income, per
dollar raised, conditional on success is therefore:
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
) rk,t+1+(1−δ)Qt+1
Qt
Pt+1
Pt
.
At the same time, the bank has to repay the deposit and equity providers.
Using the equity ratio kt, the total nominal repayment per dollar of funds due in
t+ 1 in the event of success is re,t+1kt + rd,t (1− kt).
The bank maximizes the expected discounted value of excess profits, i.e. rev-
enues minus funding costs, using the stochastic discount factor of the equity hold-
ers, i.e. the household. Given the success probability of qt,
21 the bank’s objective
function is:
max
qt,kt
βE
[
Λt+1
πt+1
qt
((
ω1 − ω2
2
qt
) rk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
πt+1 − rd,t(1− kt)− re,t+1kt
)]
.
(7)
Note that we did not multiply the per-unit profits by the quantity of investment.
By doing so we anticipate the equilibrium condition that the bank, whose objective
function is linear in the quantity of investment, needs to be indifferent about the
quantity of investment. The quantity will be pinned down together with the return
on capital by the bank’s balance sheet equation et+dt = Qtot, the market clearing
and zero-profit conditions.
2.4.1 Simplified version of the bank model
The bank’s problem can be solved analytically, yet the expressions get fairly com-
plex. Therefore we derive here the solution for ψ = θ = 0, that is without deposit
insurance and with a liquidation value of 0. This simplifies the expressions but the
intuition remains the same. Allowing ψ and θ to be nonzero on the other hand is
21Here we anticipate that the bank defaults in the event of a bad project outcome. See Section
2.4.3
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in real variables expressed in marginal utility units:22
ω1qtr˜l,t − ω2
2
q2t r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)− qtr˜e,tkt , (8)
For later use we rewrite the household’s no-arbitrage conditions (1) and (2) com-
bined with the definition of the funds’ returns (3) and (4) as r˜d,t =
R˜t
qt
and
r˜e,t =
R˜t+ξ˜t
qt
. We now solve the bank’s problem recursively.At the second stage,
the bank has already raised et + dt funds and now needs to choose the risk char-
acteristic of the investment qt, such that equity holders’ utility is maximized. As
already mentioned, we assume that the bank cannot write contracts conditional on
qt with the depositors at stage one, since qt is not observable to them. Therefore,
at the second stage the bank takes the deposit rate as given. Furthermore, since
the capital structure is already determined, maximizing the excess profit coincides
with maximizing the profit of equity holders.23 The bank’s second stage problem
is therefore (see Figure 1 for illustration):
max
qt
ω1qtr˜l,t − ω2
2
q2t r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt) . (9)
Deriving problem (9) with respect to qt yields the following first order condition:
qˆt =
ω1r˜l,t − r˜d,t (1− kt)
ω2r˜l,t
. (10)
This condition defines the optimum, provided the solution is interior. From
now on we shall always assume that solutions are interior, which of course implies
certain restrictions on parameters.24
At the first stage, the bank chooses the capital structure kt to maximize excess
profits, anticipating the qˆt(kt) that will be chosen at the second stage, and subject
necessary to bring the model closer to the data. The solution for the general case
is discussed in Section 2.4.3.
To make notation more tractable we rewrite the bank’s objective function (7)
22That is, we use the following definitions: r˜l,t = Et
[
Λt+1
(
rk,t+1+(1−δ)Qt+1
Qt
)]
, r˜d,t =
Et
[
Λt+1
rd,t
πt+1
]
, r˜e,t = Et
[
Λt+1
re,t+1
πt+1
]
, R˜t = Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
, ξ˜t = Et [Λt+1ξt] .
23I.e. we could equivalently have the banker maximize expected profits net of the opportunity
costs of equity: maxqt ω1qtr˜l,t − ω22 q2t r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)− qtr˜e,tkt s.t. r˜e,t = R˜t+ξ˜tqt
24We focus on interior solutions, since our objective is to explain both the risk and leverage
choices of the bank, and to allow them to depend on the state of the economy. In the estimation
we verify that the parameters are such as to allow for an interior solution of the bank’s problem
in the vicinity of the steady state.
to the participation constraints (i.e. the funding supply schedules) for depositors
and equity providers:
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max
kt
qˆtω1r˜l,t − ω2
2
r˜l,tqˆ
2
t − qˆtr˜d,t(1− kt)− qˆtr˜e,tkt , (11)
s.t. r˜d,t =
R˜t
qˆt
and r˜e,t =
R˜t + ξ˜t
qˆt
This problem can be solved for kt as:
25
kˆt ≡ kt (r˜l,t) = 1− ξ˜t(R˜t + ξ˜t)(ω1r˜l,t)
2
ω2R˜tr˜l,t
(
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
2
) . (12)
Since there is a continuum of identical banks, each bank behaves competitively
taking the return on investment r˜l,t as given, and there are no expected excess
profits to be made. In the presence of uncertainty it is natural to focus on the case
that banks make no excess profit in any future state of the world:
(
ω1 − ω2
2
qt−1
)(rk,t + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
)
− rd,t−1
πt
(1− kˆt−1)− re,t
πt
kˆt−1 = 0 . (13)
Using the equity and deposit supply schedules and taking expectation over this
equation we get:
qˆtω1r˜l,t − ω2
2
r˜l,tqˆ
2
t − kˆtξ˜t − R˜t = 0 . (14)
Combining (14) with the optimality conditions (10) and (12), we can derive
analytical expressions for the equity ratio kt, riskiness choice qt (the last term in
each row is an approximation under certainty equivalence and Rrt ≡ Rt/Et [πt+1]):
25Notice that we focus on the solution associated with the bigger of 2 roots for qt. This solution
is closer to the optimal choice of qt, as discussed below.
kt =
R˜t
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
≈
Rrt
Rrt + 2ξt
(15)
qt =
ω1(ξ˜t + R˜t)
ω2(2ξ˜t + R˜t)
≈
ω1(ξt +R
r
t )
ω2(2ξt +Rrt )
(16)
2.4.2 Properties of the banking sector equilibrium
These results for the banking sector risk choice have five interesting implications
that we first summarize in a proposition, before intuitively discussing them in turn.
Proposition 1: Be [r˜l,t, qt, kt] an equilibrium in the banking sector with interior
bank choices under perfect competition. Denote the expected return on investment
expressed in units of capital by f(qt) ≡
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
qt. Then:
(1) Risk decreases in the real interest rate: ∂qt
∂R˜t
> 0 .
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(2) The equity ratio increases in the real interest rate: ∂kt
∂R˜t
> 0 .
(3) Risk taking is excessive: qt < argmax f(qt) .
(4) The expected return on investment increases in the real interest rate:
∂f(qt)
∂R˜t
> 0 .
(5) The expected return on investment is a concave function of the real
interest rate ∂
2f(qt)
∂R˜2t
< 0 .
The proof can be found in Appendix C. Figure 1 illustrates the properties 1, 3 and
4.
The first two results can be easily seen from equations (15) and (16). As the
real risk-free rate Rrt decreases, the equity ratio kt falls as banks replace equity
with deposits and the riskiness of the bank increases (qt falls).
26 The intuition
behind this result is as follows: On the one hand, a lower risk-free rate decreases
the rate of return on capital projects, reducing the benefits of safer investments,
26At least under certainty equivalence or up to a first-order approximation, when the Λt+1
terms contained in the tilde variables cancel each other out.
Figure 1: The bank’s risk choice: The solid line is the expected return of the investment
as a function of the level of safety q chosen. The dashed curve describes the return on equity,
which is maximized at the second stage for given rd, rl and k. It’s maximum is marked by the
black dot. A reduction in the real rate, through its effects on (1−k)rd/rl shifts the dashed curve
down-left (not shown), which leads to a lower choice of q (gray dot).
conditional on repayment. This induces the bank to adopt a riskier investment
technology. On the other hand, the lower risk-free rate reduces the cost of funding,
leaving more resources available to the bank’s owners in case of repayment: this
force contrasts with the first one, making safer investments more attractive. There
is a third force: a lower risk-free interest rate means that the equity premium
becomes relatively more important. As a result the bank shifts from equity to
deposits, internalizing less the consequences of the risk decision and choosing a
higher level of risk. The first and third effects dominate, and overall a decline in
the real interest rate induces banks to choose more risk. Note that these two results
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depend on the assumption that the (discounted) equity premium is independent
of the (discounted) real interest rate. If we allowed the equity premium to be a
function ξ˜t
(
R˜t
)
of the real interest rate, the result would continue to hold under
the condition that ξ˜t
(
R˜t
)
> ξ˜t
′ (
R˜t
)
R˜t, which rules out proportionality. This
mechanism provides a rationalization of the first stylized fact mentioned before:
that a decline in the nominal interest rate27 causes an increase in bank risk-taking.
The third result implies that the bank’s investment could have a higher ex-
pected return (in units of capital) if the bank chose a higher level of safety.
27In a monetary model, a cut in the nominal interest rate, the standard monetary policy tool,
is followed by a decline in the real interest rate due to price stickiness.
In other words, risk taking is excessive, i.e. suboptimally high. This is due to
the agency problem, which arises from limited liability and the lack of commit-
ment/contractability of the banker regarding his risk choice. The importance of
this friction can be assessed by comparing the solution of the imperfect markets
bank model with the solution of the model without any frictions. The frictionless
risk choice can be derived under any of the following alternative scenarios: ei-
ther the equity premium is zero (which eliminates the cost disadvantage of equity
and leads to 100% equity finance), or contracts are complete (which eliminates
the agency problem and leads to 100% deposit finance), or liability is not limited
(as before), or households invests directly into a diversified portfolio of capital
projects (which eliminates the financial sector altogether). In a frictionless model
qt is chosen to maximize the consumption value of the expected return:
28
maxqt r˜l,t(ω1 −
ω2
2
qt)qt ,
and the optimal level of qt trivially is q
o
t =
ω1
ω2
. Comparing the frictionless risk
choice qot and the choice given the friction q
f
t ,
qft = q
o
t
ξ˜t + R˜t
2ξ˜t + R˜t
≈ qot
ξt +R
r
t
2ξt +Rrt
,
we observe that the agency friction drives a wedge between the frictionless risk level
and the level that is actually chosen. This wedge has two important features. First,
it is smaller than one,29 implying that under the agency problem the probability
of repayment is too low, and hence banks choose excessive risk. Second, note that
the wedge depends on Rrt and that the derivative of the first-order approximation
of the wedge w.r.t. Rrt is positive. This implies that the wedge increases, i.e. risk
taking gets more excessive, as the real interest rate falls. As we move further away
from the optimal level of risk the expected return on investments necessarily falls,
which is the fourth result above.
28Note that in the model with full deposit insurance, also this insurance needs to be eliminated
in order to obtain the efficient allocation.
29This is true under certainty equivalence, i.e. up to first-order approximation.
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But it is not only the bank risk choice that is suboptimal. The capital structure
is chosen suboptimally too. If banks could commit to choose the optimal level of
risk, they would not need any skin in the game. Hence they would avoid costly
equity and would finance themselves entirely through deposits: kot = 0. Instead
they choose kft =
R˜t
R˜t+2ξ˜t
. The equity ratio resembles the two features of risk taking.
First, there is excessive use of equity funding. Second, the equity ratio is increasing
in Rrt up to a first-order approximation.
Both the risk and the capital structure choices have welfare implications. A
marginal increase in qt means a more efficient risk choice, i.e. a higher expected
return, and hence should be welfare improving, ceteris paribus. At the same time
a marginal increase in kt implies, due to the equity premium, a higher markup
in the intermediation process, which distorts the consumption savings choice and
hence lowers welfare, ceteris paribus. Since both qt and kt are increasing functions
of the real interest rate, this begs the question as to whether an increase in the real
rate alleviates or intensifies the misallocation due to the banking friction.30 The
answer to this question depends on the full set of general-equilibrium conditions.
Given the estimated model, we will later numerically verify that the positive first
effect dominates, i.e. an increase in Rrt has welfare improving consequences for the
banking market.31 The existence of these opposing welfare effects motivates our
optimal policy experiments in Section 4.
Finally, the last statement of the proposition implies that a mean-preserving
increase in the variance of the real interest rate decreases the mean of the expected
return on the bank’s investment. This has implications for optimal monetary
policy. As we discuss in detail later, the monetary authority cannot affect the
nonstochastic steady state of the real rate, but it can influence its volatility. The
policy maker therefore has an incentive to keep the real interest rate stable, at
least as long as the opposing effect of the equity premium is negligible.
While Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) derive results that resemble part 1 and 2 of
this proposition, we go further by analyzing also the efficiency properties of risk
taking in parts 3 to 5. This is useful to understand potential policy implications,
30These two opposing forces are well known from the literature on bank capital regulation,
where a rise in capital requirements hampers efficient intermediation but leads to a more stable
banking sector.
31The dominance of the risk-taking effect is intuitive for two reasons. First, while risk taking
entails a real cost, the equity premium just entails a wedge but no direct real costs. Second, as
the real interest rate increases the equity premium becomes less important, so a more efficient
allocation is intuitive.
which we discuss below. Besides, in the next subsection we show that these results
continue to hold for several extensions of the model. Moreover, our model makes
a different assumption on timing, which is reflected in the way that ω2 appears in
the objective function. Our setup does not just simplify the algebra, but, more
importantly, it is also more natural in the context of a macro model, since it nests
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the RBC model as as special case. Finally note that those authors consider two
settings, one where banks behave competitively and one where they have price
setting power on the loan markets. While we focus on perfect competition for
simplicity, it is reassuring that their results hold in both cases.
At the end of this subsection on the banks, let us briefly zoom out and consider
the model as a whole. Note that the introduction of the financial sector adds two
new variables to the standard New Keynesian model: The risk choice qt and the
capital structure kt. These choices imply two deviations from the New Keynesian
model: While the capital structure choice introduces a time-varying spread be-
tween the return on capital and the return on investment, the risk choice implies
that the efficiency of the capital production function varies with the interest rate.
After substituting out all the financial sector variables in the system of equilib-
rium conditions, these two distortions show up as wedges that depend on the real
interest rate in the household’s Euler equation for physical capital and (in the lat-
ter case) the capital accumulation equation. Once any of the assumptions about
financial frictions (incomplete contracts, limited liability, equity premium) are re-
moved, the banks choices become optimal and constant and the model collapses
to the New Keynesian model.32
2.4.3 Full model with deposit insurance and liquidation value
The simplified version of the bank’s problem presented so far is useful to explain
the basic mechanism. Yet deposit insurance and a non-zero liquidation value are
important to improve the quantitative fit of our model to the data.
The assumptions made about deposit insurance and the liquidation value imply
that depositors get the maximum of the amount covered by deposit insurance and
the value of the capital recovered from a failed project. That means that their
32Given adequate values for the parameters ω1 and ω2. Below we enforce this restriction.
return in case of default is:
min
(
rd,t
πt+1
, max
(
rk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt(1− kt)
θ
1− kt ,
ψ
1− kt
))
.
To make deposit insurance meaningful we assume that the liquidation value θ
is small enough such that
rk,t+1+(1−δ)Qt+1
Qt(1−kt)
θ
1−kt <
ψ
1−kt , which eliminates the inner
maximum.33 As the following lemma states, proven in Appendix C, the outer
maximum is unambiguous in equilibrium.34
33We later verify this assumption numerically at the steady state for the estimated model. In
principle the fact that the return on capital is determined only one period later implies that we
could have cases where this inequality is satisfied for some states of the world and violated for
others. We abstract from this complication, since we later approximate our model locally around
the steady state, which allows us to consider only small shocks.
34For this result we again abstract from the effect of uncertainty. See the previous footnote.
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Lemma: There can be no equilibrium such that the insurance cap is not binding,
i.e.
rd,t
πt+1
> ψ
1−kt .
Deposits therefore pay ψ
1−kt in case of default. Combining the nominal return on
the deposit fund (3) with the household’s no-arbitrage condition (1), and defining
ψ˜t = E [Λt+1]ψ, we can write the deposit supply schedule as
qtr˜d,t + (1− qt) ψ˜t
1− kt = R˜t . (17)
We assume that the deposit insurance scheme, which covers the gap between
the insurance cap and the liquidation value for the depositors of failing banks, is
financed through a variable tax on capital that is set ex post each period such that
the insurance scheme breaks even. The return on loans r˜l,t can then be rewritten
as:
r˜l,t ≡ Et
[
Λt+1
rk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1 − τt+1
Qt
]
where τt =
Qt−1
1−qt−1
qt−1
(
ψ − θ rk,t+(1−δ)Qt
Qt−1
)
ω1 − ω22 qt−1
This way, the tax also perfectly offsets the distortion in the quantity of investment
caused by the deposit insurance. Deposit insurance therefore influences only the
funding decision of the bank and, through that, the risk choice. Hence, if qt was
chosen optimally (or was simply a parameter) the deposit insurance would not
have any effect.
The same procedure as outlined above can be applied to obtain closed-form
solutions35 for the risk choice and the equity ratio. The solutions can be found in
Appendix C. As stated below in proposition 2, the equilibrium characterizations
in subsection 2.4.2 remain valid. In particular, note that the deviation of the
chosen risk (equity ratio) from the optimal level decreases (increases) in the real
interest rate. Given our estimation, the risk effect dominates in terms of welfare
implications. The intuition for the risk-taking channel is similar to before.
Deposit insurance makes deposits cheaper relative to equity. As a result, the
bank demands more deposits and chooses a riskier investment portfolio. Deposit
insurance furthermore strengthens the risk-taking channel, which is now affected
not only by the importance of the equity premium relative to the real interest
rate, but also by the importance of the deposit insurance cap relative to the real
interest rate. On the other hand, the efficient risk level is not affected by deposit
insurance.
35In this case, one needs to apply the adjusted deposit supply schedule (17) and to make
sensible assumptions about the relative size of parameters and about the root when solving the
zero-profit equation.
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The liquidation value, on the other hand, is irrelevant for the banks’ and in-
vestors’ choice, since it is assumed to be smaller than deposit insurance. Yet it
eases the excessiveness of risk taking, since it increases the optimal level of risk:
qot =
ω1−θ
ω2
.
An additional implication of our model is that both the expected loan prof-
itability and, given the parameters estimated in Section 3, the loan risk premium
fall as the real interest rate declines: a result which is in line with the respective
findings of Ioannidou et al. (2014) and Buch et al. (2014).
Finally, we would like to point out that none of the results in proposition 1 is
due to the functional form that we have assumed for the risk return trade-off.36
36Proposition 1 is also robust to the alternative assumption that deposit insurance covers a
fraction α of either the principal or the total value of outstanding deposits for low enough values
of α. However, for high values of α the solution of the bank’s capital structure choice problem
is no longer interior and the model predicts k=0. I.e. the function k(α) features as jump from
medium levels of k to 0 at medium levels of α. Due to this feature, these alternative models
can not simultaneously match the empirical targets (for q, k and the expected return), which we
match in the calibration Section; we therefore focus on the specification in the text.
The statement holds even for a generic function f(qt)
37 under relatively weak
assumptions, some of which are sufficient but non necessary. For a proof and a
discussion of these assumptions see Appendix C.
Proposition 2: Be [r˜l,t, qt, kt] an equilibrium in the banking sector with interior
bank choices under perfect competition. Denote the expected return on investment
- now inclusive of the liquidation value - expressed in units of capital by f (qt) ≡(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
qt + (1 − qt)θ = f (qt) + (1 − qt)θ. Consider the 5 statements from
proposition 1, but replace f (qt) by f (qt). Then:
(1) Given this adjustment, all five statements of proposition 1 hold for the
full bank model with deposit insurance and a small enough liquidation
value as well.
(2) Given this adjustment, statements (1)-(4) of proposition 1 hold for a
generic conditional expected return function f(qt) with deposit insur-
ance and a small enough liquidation value under the additional assump-
tions that f(qt) satisfies f(qt) ≥ 0, f ′′(qt) < 0, f ′′′(qt) ≤ 0, f ′′′′(qt) ≤ 0.
Statement (5) holds if furthermore either the default probability is low
relative to the parameters qt
(1−qt) ξ˜t ≥ R˜t − ψ˜t or there is no deposit
insurance ψ˜t = 0.
2.5 Labor and goods sectors
The labor and goods sectors feature monopolistic competition and nominal rigidi-
ties as Calvo (1983), which allow for a role for monetary policy. Since the modeling
37Given that the recovery value f(qt) now describes the expected return conditional on success.
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of these sectors follows the canonical New Keynesian model, we discuss them briefly
in Appendix B and refer to Smets and Wouters (2007) and Adjemian et al. (2008)
for further details.
2.6 Monetary and fiscal policy
The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule, targeting inflation and out-
put deviations from the steady state. In addition, the fiscal authority finances a
stochastic expenditure stream gyY¯ ε
G
t through lump sum taxes.
3 Dynamic implications of the risk-taking chan-
nel in the estimated model
We have embedded our risk-taking channel in a medium-scale model which closely
resembles the non-linear version38 of Smets and Wouters (2007), and we next esti-
mate the model parameters using Bayesian techniques. This serves two purposes.
First, we want to assess whether the risk-taking channel improves the quantitative
fit of the model, once other monetary and real frictions are taken into account.
Second, Smets and Wouters (2007) provide a quantitative model that is able to
replicate key empirical moments of the data, which are needed for the monetary
policy evaluation we perform in Section 4.
3.1 Model estimation
We estimate a linearized version of the model with Bayesian techniques using eight
US macroeconomic time series covering the period of the great moderation from
1984Q1 to 2007Q3. These include the seven series used by Smets and Wouters
(2007), i.e. the federal funds rate, the log of hours worked, inflation and the growth
rates in the real hourly wage and in per-capita real GDP, real consumption, and
real investment. To identify the banking sector parameters we add a series of the
banking sector equity ratio, which we construct from aggregate bank balance-sheet
data provided by the FDIC. For a full description of the data we refer to Appendix
A and to the supplementary material of Smets and Wouters (2007). The observa-
tion equations, linking the observed time series to the variables in the model, as
well as the prior specifications and other details regarding the estimation can be
found in Appendix B. While the priors of the non-bank parameters follow Smets
38Our model deviates from Smets and Wouters (2007) only to the extent that we abstract
(for simplicity) from capital utilization, shown by the authors to be of secondary importance
once wage stickiness is taken into account, and growth. We also use internal instead of external
habits to avoid another source of inefficiency. Furthermore, since we add a time series for the
estimation, we introduce a time preference shock and a bank equity premium shock instead of
their risk premium shock.
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and Wouters (2007), the priors for the banking sector parameters are motivated by
historical averages and external estimates for the US. Note that instead of form-
ing priors directly about ω2 (risk return trade-off) and ψ (deposit insurance), we
rewrite these parameters as functions of the steady-state equity ratio k¯ and default
rate q¯. The prior mean of the steady-state equity premium ξ is centered around an
annualized value of 6%, in line with the empirical estimates of Mehra and Prescott
(1985), while the prior distribution for k¯ is diffuse and centered around the historic
mean of 12%. The prior for the liquidation value θ is set such that it is contained
between 0.3 and 0.7 with a 95% probability, in line with the evidence provided
by Altman et al. (2003). The success rate q¯ is not well identified and is therefore
fixed to 0.99, which implies an annual default rate of 4%, roughly in line with
the historical average of delinquency rates on US business loans. Sensitivity tests
have moreover shown that this parameter is only of small quantitative relevance.39
Lastly, we normalize the units of capital versus final goods by setting ω1 (return
on the risky asset) such that one unit of final good is expected to produce one unit
of capital good in steady state.
Table 4 in Appendix B summarizes the posterior parameter values, which are
broadly in line with existing empirical estimates for the US. The key banking
sector parameters that determine the importance of the risk-taking channel are well
identified by the data. The steady-state equity ratio has a tight posterior around
12%, the posterior mean of the equity premium is around an annualized value
of 9%, and the liquidation value is about 74%.40 For the following quantitative
analysis we set the parameters to their posterior means.
39In particular, the implications for optimal monetary policy behavior are very robust to the
value of the steady state default rate. What matters is the importance of the channel over
the business cycle, determined predominantly by the liquidation value and the scope of deposit
insurance.
40The implied mean value for deposit insurance cap ψ of about 88% implies that 99% of deposits
are insured in steady state. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2005) report that the explicit deposit insurance
scheme in the US is estimated to cover between 60% and 65% of deposits. The divergence can
be interpreted as implicit deposit guarantees resulting from the expectation of bailouts. The
implied mean values of ω1 (1.13) and ω2 (0.2561) yield a corner solution for q
opt at 1.
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Figure 2: Monetary policy shock in the bank and benchmark models: dynamic
responses in the bank model (solid red lines) and in the benchmark model (dashed blue lines) to
an expansionary monetary policy shock, at the mean of the posterior distribution. Shaded areas
denote the highest posterior density interval at 90% for the bank model impulse responses, and
the black line the steady-state level. Inflation and interest rates are quarter-on-quarter rates.
3.2 Dynamic implications of excessive risk taking
To illustrate the dynamic effects of the risk-taking channel, we assess how the prop-
agation of monetary policy shocks is affected by the risk-taking channel. For this
purpose, we compare the impulse responses of two models: with banking frictions
(henceforth bank model), and without banking frictions. To enable the dynamic
comparison, we equalize the steady states of the two economies. In particular, we
alter the model without financial frictions by treating the risk choice qt and the
equity ratio kt as fixed parameters, which we set to the steady-state values of the
bank model. This model, henceforth benchmark model, has the same steady state
as the bank model and corresponds to a standard New Keynesian model with a
small markup in capital markets.
In Figure 2 we compare the dynamic responses in the bank model (solid red
lines) and in the benchmark model (dashed blue lines) to an expansionary mon-
etary policy shock. A monetary policy expansion triggers a set of standard re-
actions, which are evident in the benchmark model. An unexpected fall in the
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nominal risk-free rate causes a drop in the real interest rate, since prices are sticky.
Consequently, consumption is shifted forward, firms that can adjust the price do
so, causing an increase in inflation, while the remaining firms increase production.
The risk-taking channel adds two further elements, as both the risk level and the
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capital structure chosen by the bank respond to the real interest rate movement.
On impact, the drop in the real interest rate cause banks to replace equity with
deposits, since the relative cost advantage of deposits increases. Consequently,
banks have less skin in the game and hence take more risk (lower loan safety).
The risk choice therefore moves further away from the optimal level, and the ex-
pected return on aggregate investment f(qt) drops.
41 To maintain the same path
of capital as in the benchmark case, households would have to invest more and
consume less. Yet this would not be optimal because of consumption smoothing
and because of the lower expected return on investment. Therefore, investment
rises by less than what would be needed to compensate the loss in investment
efficiency, which makes the capital stock decline considerably. Overall, agents are
worse off (in terms of welfare) in the bank model than in the benchmark economy.
3.3 Evaluating the fit of the estimated model
Comparing our bank model to the benchmark Smets and Wouters (2007)-type
model, we find that the bank model does a better job at explaining the 7 non-
financial variables.42 In particular, the posterior odds ratio of exp(2.86) can be
interpreted as providing ’positive’ evidence in favor of the bank model, according
to Jeffreys (1961) and Kass and Raftery (1995). To evaluate the plausibility of
the strength of the proposed channel, we furthermore estimate a meta-model that
nests both the benchmark and the bank model. This meta-model is characterized
41Note that the decline in the equity ratio diminishes the distortion due to the equity premium,
which reduces the cost of capital. Yet this effect is tiny relative to the increase in the cost of
capital due to lower investment efficiency.
42Recall that the Smets and Wouters (2007)-type model is obtained by turning off the banking
sector frictions. Hence bank leverage is no longer defined. For the comparison we therefore
estimate the two versions of the model (with and without the banking frictions) using only the
seven macro aggregates used by Smets and Wouters (2007), and calibrate the banking parameters
in the bank model to the posterior mean from our main estimation (Table 4).
by the auxiliary parameter Γ, which defines the weight on each of the two models.43
Using a flat prior from 0 to 1, we find that the posterior mean for Γ lies at the
corner at 0, implying that the data rejects the benchmark model in favor of the
risk-taking channel.44
A close examination of the role of the investment efficiency shock in the two
estimated models provides some intuition for why the risk-taking channel improves
the fit of the model. In particular, we find that the introduction of the banking
frictions reduces the forecast error variance of output by a third, while the vari-
ance decomposition share of the investment shock drops from around 49 percent
43To set up this meta-model, we replace the equations for kt and qt in the bank model with:
kt = Γk
benchmark
t + (1− Γ)kbankt and qt = Γqbenchmarkt (1− Γ)qbankt , where kxt corresponds to the
RHS of the corresponding equation from the x model. Again, this estimation is run using the 7
non-financial time series with fixed banking sector parameters.
44Note that this result is robust to removing the bounds of the prior.
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(estimated benchmark model) to 34 percent (estimated bank model) for horizons
between 3 and 8 quarters. This relates to the argument of Justiniano et al. (2011),
who find that the major role of this shock in explaining GDP volatility in the
canonical medium-scaled Smets and Wouters (2007) model could be a spurious
result that captures unmodeled financial frictions. In reducing the importance of
this shock, the risk-taking channel seems to be capable of capturing at least some
of this missing mechanism. This is intuitive because both the investment shock εIt
and the expected return on the banks’ investment f(qt) = qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
+(1− qt)θ
enter the capital accumulation equation multiplicatively:
Kt =
[
εIt (1− S(it/it−1)) it + (1− δ)Kt−1
] [
qt
(
ω1 − ω2
2
qt
)
+ (1− qt)θ
]
.
Yet the two are not perfectly isomorphic, since the shock affects only net invest-
ment, while the expected return on investment affects gross investment. Moreover,
the path of εIt backed out from the estimated benchmark model is strongly corre-
lated with the path of the return on investment in the estimated bank model.45
To evaluate the fit with respect to financial variables we look at two statistics
45For this exercise we use the same specification as for the likelihood comparison. Notice
that the specification of our model is not exactly the same as Smets and Wouters (2007) and
Justiniano et al. (2011) since we have abstracted from capital utilization and use internal rather
than external habits. This means that the numbers are not directly comparable.
that were not targeted by the estimation. First, we compare the model-implied
series for the risk variable qt with a survey-based proxy for bank risk taking. The
latter is a weighted average46 of the internal risk rating assigned by banks to
newly issued loans, provided by the US Terms of Business Lending Survey, and
inverted so as to match the definition of qt in the model. Figure 3 shows that
the model implies a cyclical pattern of risk that is roughly in line with the survey
measure (the correlation is 60 percent). Second, the responses in Figure 2 also
show that, conditional on the monetary policy shock, leverage (the inverse of the
equity ratio kt) is pro-cyclical with respect to the size of the bank balance sheet
et + dt. Conditional on the full set of shocks, we find a correlation of 43 percent
which is in line with the evidence for US data provided by Adrian and Shin (2014),
and distinguishes our model from canonical financial accelerator models that build
on Bernanke et al. (1999).47
Overall, these findings suggest that the inclusion of the risk-taking channel
improves the fit of nonfinancial data, while at the same time matching two key
characteristics of aggregate banking sector data.
46For a detailed discussion about this variable we refer to Appendix D.
47See, for instance, the discussion in Adrian et al. (2015).
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Figure 3: Risk taking in the model and in the data: The Figure compares the value
of loan safety qt implied by the estimated model (in particular we plot the mean of the series
posterior distribution) with a survey-based index of loan safety computed from the US Terms of
Business Lending Survey. For a more detailed discussion see text and Appendix D.
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4 Monetary policy with the risk-taking channel
Optimal monetary policy in the benchmark Smets and Wouters (2007)-type model
is well understood: it generally aims at mitigating the effect of coexisting nominal
frictions (price and wage stickiness) and real frictions (monopolistic competition in
goods and labor markets). The effect of price stickiness can be avoided by keeping
price inflation stable. This way price dispersion and the productive inefficiencies
associated with it are eliminated. While wage stickiness and the real frictions
provide a motive to deviate from strict price inflation stabilization, their effect is
typically quantitatively small and it is therefore, as Woodford (2004) puts it, “not
a bad first approximation to say that the goal of monetary policy should be price
stability”. This goal is easy to implement with a simple Taylor rule that attaches
a major weight to inflation.
The financial sector modeled in this paper adds another real friction: inefficient
risk taking. As we have shown in the two propositions in Section 2.4, the intensity
of this distortion depends on the real interest rate: Increases in the latter lower
risk taking towards its efficient level, thereby increasing the aggregate efficiency of
the capital production technology. Furthermore, we have shown that the efficiency
of risk taking f (qt) is concave in the real interest rate. This statement has two
implications. First, an increase in the mean of the real rate improves the average
efficiency of the risk choice f(qt). Second, a mean-preserving spread of the real
rate reduces the average expected return on investments f (qt).
What does this new friction imply for the monetary policy maker? Due to
monetary neutrality in the long run, monetary policy cannot affect the long run
level (the mean, to first order) of the real rate and hence the long run effect of this
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friction. However, due to price stickiness, by setting the nominal rate, the policy
maker can affect the volatility of the real rate. This in turn affects the average
level of the efficiency of the risk choice f (qt) due to the concavity of f (qt) in the
real rate. Therefore the risk-taking channel provides a motive for keeping the real
interest rate constant. Just as price stickiness calls for a reduction of the volatility
of inflation, risk taking calls for a reduction of the volatility of the real rate.
Yet this new objective conflicts with the inflation stabilization objective result-
ing from nominal rigidities, since the latter call for aggressive movements in both
the nominal and the real rate. The risk-taking channel therefore introduces a new
monetary policy trade-off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization.
As a result, the central bank should accept higher inflation volatility in order to
reduce the distortion stemming from risk taking.
But is this new trade-off actually quantitatively significant for monetary policy?
Given that previous studies have found the optimality of inflation stabilization to
be quantitatively robust to the introduction of financial frictions (e.g. De Fiore
and Tristani (2013) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001)), the answer to this question
is not trivial. To answer this question we determine optimal simple implementable
monetary policy rules in both the bank and benchmark models, and compare their
performance in the bank economy. This comparison has an interesting interpre-
tation. Suppose that the actual economy features the risk-taking channel (the
bank model), but that the central bank is unaware of this channel and believes
that risk cannot be influenced by the interest rate. The central bank would then
implement optimal policy based on a wrong model (the benchmark model). Our
comparison then answers the question of how important it is to understand the
risk-taking channel, in terms of optimal policy and welfare. For this experiment
we use the parameters estimated for the bank model both for the bank and bench-
mark economy.48 This allows us to isolate the dynamic differences of the two
models. However, taking this interpretation literally, it might seem more natural
to assume that the central bank determines her policy based on an estimation of
the benchmark model. As Appendix D shows, the findings we report below are
robust (slightly stronger) to this alternative scenario.
Notice that in this paper we consider a central bank that has no policy tools
besides the interest rate; in particular it does not regulate the equity ratio. This has
implications for our positive and our normative analysis. Regarding the former, we
believe that abstracting from regulation is acceptable for several reasons. First, the
regulatory framework in place during most of the estimation period (Basel I), seems
48I.e. we keep all parameters fixed for this comparison, apart from the banking sector which
we switch on or off.
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to have been too lax to be considered effectively binding.49 Second, a large share
of the financial system, from off-balance-sheet vehicles to investment banks, is not
covered by regulation. Third, our model predicts a negative correlation between
the equity ratio and the interest rate, which in turn is negatively correlated to
the cycle. Hence, with countercyclical regulation, which is endorsed in the latest
regulatory framework (Basel III), the regulatory capital ratio would move in a
similar way as postulated by our model.
Analyzing the normative implications of the risk-taking channel for regulation,
though interesting, goes beyond the scope of the present paper.50 Arguably such
an attempt might require a more complex model, where regulators can control
bank risk choices only to a limited extent, and where a role for monetary policy
remains. Instead we focus on what the monetary policy maker can do about risk
taking in the (realistic) case that the problem persists despite regulation. Using
monetary policy to address shortcomings of “imperfect” regulation is advocated
in a similar context e.g. by Stein (2013) and Bean et al. (2015).
4.1 The central bank problem
We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and characterize optimal monetary
policy as the policy rule that maximizes welfare among the class of simple, imple-
mentable interest-rate feedback rules51 given by
Rt − R¯ = φππˆt+s + φyyˆt+s + φkkˆt+s + ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
, (18)
49According to the Basel I accord implemented in 1992, banks were required to hold capital
equal to 8% of their risk-weighted assets. Mortgages and mortgage-backed security held a very
low risk weight, arguably leading banks to acquire more of these assets in order to reduce their
total risk-weighted assets and through that, bank requirements. The share of risk-weighted assets
to total bank assets fell in fact from 70% in 1992 to about 35% in the years preceding the crisis
(Slovik (2012)), implying that regulation was based only on a small fraction of banks’ balance
sheets. As the 2008 financial crisis shows, the risks tackled by regulation did not coincide with
the actual risks to which the financial sector was ultimately exposed.
50For an analysis of macroprudential regulation in an economy with bank risk-taking see for
example Collard et al. (2012).
51The implementability criterion requires uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium,
while simplicity requires the interest rate to be a function of readily observable variables. For
a complete discussion, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). Notice that we drop their second
requirement for implementability, which is that an implementable rule must avoid regular zero
lower bound violations.
where the hat symbol denotes percentage deviations from the steady state (in case
of s > 0 in expectations), and the index s allows for forward- or contemporaneous-
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looking rules (respectively by setting s = 1 or s = 0).52 The policy rule specifica-
tion (18) is chosen for its generality, as it encompasses both standard Taylor-type
rules (setting φk = 0), and the possibility that the central bank reacts to banking
sector leverage, the inverse of the equity ratio k (φk = 0). A fall in the equity ratio
implies that banks increase their debt financing, i.e. they increase leverage. As
a consequence, banks internalize less the downside risk of their investments, and
choose loans with a higher default probability. Hence, a fall in the equity ratio
signals an increase in risk taking, to which the central bank may want to respond
by increasing the interest rate. We choose not to let the interest rate depend on
risk taking directly, because the latter is not a readily observable variable. We
furthermore impose that the inertia parameter ρ has to be non-negative. Since
we are interested in the effect of systematic monetary policy, we switch off the
monetary policy shock for this experiment.
The welfare criterion that defines the optimal parameter combination for rule
(18) is the household’s conditional lifetime utility.53 In order to compare welfare
levels we define the measure Ω as the fraction of the consumption stream that
a household would need to receive as a transfer under the suboptimal rule to be
equally well off as under the optimal rule. If o denotes the optimal rule and s
another suboptimal rule, this fraction Ω is implicitly defined by the equation:
V o = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtεBt u((1 + Ω)c
s
t , L
s
t) .
52Alternative ways to get at optimal monetary policy include linear-quadratic approximation
of the welfare function and numerical determination of Ramsey optimal policy. Following a large
literature, we focus on optimal simple rules instead of Ramsey policies here, because they seem to
be more realistically implementable and they are generally found to be more robust than Ramsey
optimal policies to the model misspecification (compare e.g. Levin et al. (1999) or Taylor (2007)).
We refrain from linear-quadratic approximation because it is difficult to obtain useful results in
medium scale models with capital.
53 This measure, which is conditional on the economy being in steady state, is common in the
literature.
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54We have experimented with different estimation samples and calibrated parameter values.
While the optimized parameters and transfers slightly change, the qualitative results discussed
in the text are very robust.
Table 1: Optimal simple rules: The first (second) column describes the timing (restrictions)
of the policy rule. The last row corresponds to a rule where only φk can be chosen and the other
parameters are fixed to the optimized benchmark values. V is the welfare level associated with
each policy in the bank model. Ω is the welfare cost (in % of the consumption stream) associated
with implementing in the bank model the optimal policy rule of the benchmark model. For the
benchmark model the restriction φk = 0 is irrelevant, since the equity ratio is constant. Italics
indicate restricted parameters.
benchmark model bank model
s rule ρ φπt+s φyt+s ρ φπt+s φyt+s φkt V Ω
0 φk, ρ = 0 0 7.100 0.115 0 3.080 0.126 0 -185.321 0.476
0 φk = 0 0.000 7.100 0.115 1.059 0.510 0.005 0 -184.750 0.898
0 ρ = 0 0 7.100 0.115 0 2.637 0.097 0.027 -185.314 0.481
1 φk, ρ = 0 0 17.222 0.148 0 4.294 0.172 0 -185.209 0.687
1 φk = 0 0.236 12.084 0.124 1.114 0.072 0.074 0 -184.656 0.813
0 choose φk 0.000 7.100 0.115 0 7.100 0.115 -0.177 -185.438 0.389
4.2 Findings
Using the welfare criterion just described, we numerically determine the coefficients
of the optimal simple implementable rules in the benchmark and in the bank
model, using second-order approximations around the non-stochastic steady state.
The first five rows of Table 1 report the optimal coefficients for five different
specifications of the monetary policy rule: contemporaneous and forward-looking,
without inertia and with optimal inertia, without and with a reaction to current
leverage. The coefficients of the optimal rules generally vary greatly between the
two models. A set of results which are robust across policy rule and estimation54
specifications, are worth noticing.
First, the optimal coefficients on inflation deviations are smaller in the bank
model compared to the benchmark model. Given that the optimal output coeffi-
cient is close to zero, the optimal rule is hence closer to a stable real interest rate
rule in the bank model than in the benchmark model. Furthermore, if the central
bank can optimize over its smoothing parameter, then full interest rate smoothing
is optimal in the bank model. Table 2, which displays the changes in the mean
and volatility of key variables in switching from the benchmark optimal rule to
the bank optimal rule in the bank model, helps to understand the rationale behind
these results. By responding less aggressively to inflation and by smoothing the
nominal interest rate, the central bank limits fluctuations in the real interest rate.
The lower volatility of Rrt translates into a higher average return on investment
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f(qt) due to the concavity of this function in R
r
t .
55 This higher average return on
investment comes at the cost of a significantly higher inflation volatility. Hence,
the new trade-off between inflation and real rate stabilization implies a significant
deviation from inflation stabilization.56
To understand how different the equilibria associated to the two optimal rules
are, and therefore how important it is for the central bank to take the risk-taking
channel into account, we compute the cost Ω of applying the rule that is optimal
for the benchmark model in the bank model. These costs, expressed in % of the
lifetime consumption stream, are reported in the last column of Table 1. Though
the costs vary greatly across policy specifications, they are always significant. For
the best-performing policy (fifth row of Table 1), the costs of applying the bench-
mark policy in the bank model are around 0.81% of the lifetime consumption
stream. Unlike the financial frictions analyzed by De Fiore and Tristani (2013)
55Note that the slight increase in Rrt accounts only for a marginal fraction of the increase in
f(qt).
56One may additionally be interested to know how the OSR in the benchmark model compares
to the OSR in the bank model in terms of means and volatilities. To this end, Table 7 in
Appendix D reproduces the comparison of means and standard deviations in Table 2, but instead
of comparing how different policy rules perform in the bank model it compares the optimal simple
rules in each corresponding model. As a comparison of tables 2 and 7 reveals, virtually all of the
differences in means and volatilities documented in the Table in the Appendix are due to the
different policy rules, and not due to the differeces in the financial sector. I.e. the rule optimal
in the benchmark model delivers higher real rate volatility and lower inflation volatility both in
both in the benchmark model as well as in the bank model, compared to the bank model with
its optimized simple rule.
Table 2: Differences in moments associated with the optimal simple rules in the
benchmark and in the bank model: This Table shows the % differences in the mean and
standard deviation associated with applying the different optimal rules in the bank model. The
first entry, for example, indicates that under the optimal bank policy rule average risk would be
0.15% lower than if the rule optimal for the benchmark model had been applied.
and Bernanke and Gertler (2001), the risk-taking channel therefore has implica-
tions for monetary policy that are important both in terms of the prescribed policy
and the cost of deviating from it.
Second, including an explicit response to banking sector leverage, in addition to
inflation and output, improves welfare only marginally (compare the last column
of the first and third row of Table 1). Recall that leverage depends on both the
mean standard deviation
s rule q Rr π y c f(q) q Rr π y c
0 φk, ρ = 0 0.151 0.002 -0.051 0.311 0.499 0.045 -43.880 -47.975 52.470 -0.843 -4.108
0 φk = 0 0.214 0.007 -0.038 0.439 0.701 0.061 -67.949 -77.760 64.393 -9.545 –9.566
0 ρ = 0 0.152 0.003 -0.015 0.323 0.506 0.045 -41.666 -47.248 53.194 -0.773 -3.800
1 φk, ρ = 0 0.194 0.011 -0.037 0.413 0.652 0.062 -50.536 -55.417 57.719 -2.781 -6.906
1 φk = 0 0.195 0.004 -0.054 0.458 0.724 0.057 -65.839 -76.3112 71.906 -10.373 -11.737
0 choose φk 0.130 0.001 -0.070 0.244 0.417 0.042 -41.691 -41.948 31.838 3.323 -0.345
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nominal interest rate and expected inflation. By setting the nominal rate optimally
as a function of current inflation, the central bank can already steer risk taking,
to the extent that current and expected future inflation are highly correlated. The
fact that this correlation is not perfect, and that our approximation allows for
nonlinearities, accounts for the small improvement in welfare obtained by allowing
a response to leverage in the policy function. To further illustrate this point, in the
last row we fix the coefficients of current inflation and output to the values which
are optimal in the benchmark economy, and allow the central bank to respond
optimally only to leverage. In this case, it is optimal to strongly raise the interest
rate in response to higher leverage (lower equity ratio k). Thereby the central
bank again stabilizes the real interest rate and does not do much worse in terms
of welfare than when the responses to inflation and output are chosen optimally
(compare the last column of the third and sixth row of Tables 1 and 2).
5 Conclusion
Recent empirical evidence suggests that monetary policy can influence bank risk-
taking behaviour. However, the economic relevance of this connection and its
implications for monetary policy are still unclear. We address these questions by
developing and estimating a quantitative general-equilibrium model where interest
rates affect bank risk taking.
In the model, all savings are intermediated by banks, which make risky invest-
ments. Low levels of the risk-free interest rate induce banks to make riskier and
therefore less efficient investments. At the core of this mechanism is an agency
problem between depositors and equity providers: The latter choose the level of
risk but are protected by limited liability. The response of risk taking to interest
rates alters the dynamics in the model. To validate the risk-taking channel and
gauge its importance, we estimate the model with Bayesian methods for the US.
We find that this new channel not only improves the fit of the model but also
predicts a path for risk taking that is in line with survey evidence.
We use the model to derive both analytical and quantitative implications for
monetary policy. We show analytically that the risk-taking channel implies a
motive for real interest rate stabilization. Since this motive conflicts with the
inflation stabilization objective, it generates a new trade-off for the central bank.
We then use the estimated model to analyze the quantitative importance of this
new trade-off. We find that the risk-taking channel calls for significant deviations
from inflation stabilization. The policy maker optimally accepts 50% more inflation
volatility to reduce the volatility of the real rate by a similar share. Taking the
risk-taking channel into account generates welfare gains for consumers between
0.5% and 1%.
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Appendix A: Data description
Table 3: All level variables are expressed in per-capita terms (divided by N). Hours are
measured as H1 ·H2/N where H1 is converted into an index. The nominal wage W is deflated by
the GDP deflator. We define equity capital as equity plus reserves plus subordinated debt, and
total liabilities as equity plus deposits. To do do, we net out two types of liabilities, since they
are typically overcollateralized: federal funds purchased & repurchase agreements and federal
home loan bank advances. Furthermore, we omit a few categories of debt that match neither of
our concepts of insured deposits and equity, or that are simply not enough characterized: other
borrowed money, uncategorized liabilities, trading book liabilities, banks liability on acceptances.
All of these balance sheet positions are minor. Over the observation period, the first group
accounts for roughly 11% of the balance sheet, the second for about 9%. All indexes are adjusted
such that 2009 = 100. The estimation sample spans from 1984Q1 to 2007Q3. Our survey-based
proxy for bank risk-taking q, is constructed using data from the US Terms of Business Lending
Survey. The survey provides the internal risk rating assigned by banks to newly issued loans. In
this survey, available from 1997Q1 onwards, 400 banks report the volume of loans originated in
the first week of the mid month each quarter, grouped by internal risk rating. This rating varies
between 1 and 5, with 5 being the maximum level of risk. Following Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014),
we construct a weighted average loan risk series, using as weights the value of loans in each risk
category.
symbol series mnemonic unit source
Y real gross domestic product gdpc96 bn. usd fred / bea
P gdp deflator gdpdef index fred / bea
R effective federal funds rate fedfunds % fred / board of governors
C personal consumption expenditure pcec bn. usd fred / bea
I fixed private investment fpi bn. usd fred / bea
H1 civilian employment ce16ov thousands fred / bls
H2 nonfarm business (..) hours prs85006023 index department of labor
W nonfarm business (..) hourly compensation prs85006103 index department of labor
N civilian population lns1000000 0ce16ov bls
q average weighted loan risk own calculation % board of governors
E equity capital over liabilities own calculation % fdic
Appendix B: The full model; equilibrium and estimation
details
This Appendix outlines the set-up of the conventional parts of the model. Further-
more, it defines the equilibrium, listing all model equations, grouped by sector.
The Households’ problem: Households maximize their lifetime utility func-
tion:
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maxdt,et,st,ct,Lt E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtεBt
(ct − ιct−1)1−σC
1− σC exp
(
ϕL1+σLt
σC − 1
1 + σL
)]
,
subject to the per-period budget constraint in real terms:
ct + dt + et + st + Tt = Ltwt + dt−1
Rd,t
πt
+ et−1
Re,t
πt
+ st−1
Rt−1
πt
+Πt ,
where πt is the inflation rate, while Tt and Πt are taxes and profits from firm
ownership, expressed in real terms. We allow for habits in consumption (ι) and a
time preference shock εBt . This shock is assumed to be persistent with log-normal
innovations, like all following shocks unless otherwise specified. The household’s
optimality conditions are given by the usual Euler equation, two no-arbitrage
conditions and the labor supply condition:
Λt = βEt
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
,
Et
[
Λt+1
Rd,t+1
πt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
,
Et
[
Λt+1
Re,t+1
πt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
,
Λtwt =
(ct − ιct−1)1−σC
1− σC exp
(
ϕL1+σLt
σC − 1
1 + σL
)
(1− σC)LσLt
where Λt = ε
B
t (ct − ιct−1)−σC − βιEt
[
εBt+1 (ct+1 − ιct)−σC
]
is the marginal utility
of consumption.
Labor and goods sectors: Final goods producers assemble different varieties
of intermediate goods through a Kimball (1995) aggregator with elasticity of sub-
stitution p and Kimball parameter kp, taking as given both the final good price
and the prices of intermediate goods. Their optimization problem yields demand
functions for each intermediate good variety as a function of its relative price.
A continuum of firms produces differentiated intermediate goods using capital
Kt−1 and “packed” labor ldt as inputs. The production function is Cobb-Douglas
and is affected by a total factor productivity shock εAt . Firms use their monopolistic
power to set prices, taking as given their demand schedule. As in Calvo (1983),
they can reset their prices in each period with probability λp, otherwise they index
their prices to past inflation with degree γp and to steady-state inflation with degree
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(1− γp). Furthermore, they are subject to a time-varying mean-zero revenue tax
εpt that is equivalent to a markup shock, up to a first-order approximation.
57
The labor market resembles the product market. Packed labor is produced by
labor packers, who aggregate differentiated labor services using a Kimball (1995)
aggregator with elasticity of substitution w and Kimball parameter kw.
Differentiated labor services are produced by a continuum of unions from the
households labor supply. They use their monopolistic power to set wages. Wages
are reset with probability λw, otherwise they are indexed to past inflation (with
degree γw) and steady-state inflation. Like intermediate firms, unions are subject
to a stochastic wage tax εwt .
58
See the Appendix of Smets and Wouters (2007) for a detailed discussion of the
set-up and Adjemian et al. (2008) for the recursive formulation of the equilibrium
conditions, which we list below.
57Unlike a true markup shock, this tax allows for a recursive representation of the nonlinear
problem.
58Both εpt and ε
w
t follow the standard shock process augmented by an moving average compo-
nent, as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
Monetary and fiscal policy: The central bank follows a nominal interest rate
rule, targeting inflation and output deviations from the steady state:
Rt − R¯ = (1− ρ) (φππˆt + φyyˆt) + ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
+ εRt , (19)
where ρ is a smoothing parameter, the hat symbol denotes percentage deviations
from the steady-state values, R¯ = πss
β
is the steady-state nominal interest rate,
and εRt is a monetary policy shock. In addition, the fiscal authority finances a
stochastic expenditure stream gyY¯ ε
G
t :
ln
(
εGt
)
= ρgln
(
εGt−1
)
+ uGt + ρGAu
A
t ,
where we allow for a correlation between exogenous spending and innovations to
total factor productivity.59 For simplicity, we rule out government debt (st = 0),
implying that all expenditures are financed by lump sum taxes; i.e. gyY¯ ε
G
t = Tt .
Competitive equilibrium: The competitive equilibrium is a path of 43 vari-
ables (Λ, K, L, y, l, c, q, k, d, e, π, rk, rd, re, R, W , mc, o
new, o, π, Zp1, Zp2,
Zp3, Zw1, Zw2, Zw3, Δp1, Δp2, Δp3, Δp4, Δw1, Δw2, Δw3Δw4, τp,τw,W
, i, R˜, ξ, ξ˜,
ψ˜, τ) that satisfy the following 41 equations at each point in time, given initial
conditions and the exogenous shock processes εA, εB, εG, εI , εP , εR, εW , εξ.
59This is a shortcut to take exports into account. Productivity innovations might raise exports
in the data, and a way to capture it in a closed-economy model such as ours is to allow for
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60Note that Rd and Re have been substituted out. The FOC w.r.t. labor is merged with the
labor sector equations.
Household60
Λt = ε
B
t (ct − ιct−1)−σC − βιEt
[
εBt+1 (ct+1 − ιct)−σC
]
(20)
Et
[
Λt+1
qtrd,t+1 + (1− qt) ψ1−ktπt+1
πt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
(21)
Et
[
Λt+1
qtre,t+1 − ξtπt+1
πt+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
(22)
Λt = βEt
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
(23)
yt = ct + it + gyY¯ ε
G
t (24)
Goods sector
Ldt
Kt−1
α
1− α =
rk,t
wt
(25)
mct =
1
At
α−αrαktw
1−α
t (1− α)α−1 (26)
πt =
p (1 + kp)
p (1 + kp)− 1
Zp1,t
Zp2,t
+
kp
p − 1 (π

t )
1+p(1+kp) Zp3,t
Zp2,t
(27)
Zp1,t = ΛtmctytΔ
p(1+kp)/(1−p(1+kp))
p1,t + βλpEt
[(
πt+1
π
γp
t π¯
1−γp
)p(1+kp)
Zp1,t+1
]
(28)
Zp2,t = (1− τp,t)ΛtytΔp(1+kp)/(1−p(1+kp))p1,t + βλpEt
[(
πt+1
π
γp
t π¯
1−γp
)p(1+kp)−1
Zp2,t+1
]
(29)
Zp3,t = (1− τp,t)Λtyt + βλpEt
[(
πt+1
π
γp
t π¯
1−γp
)−1
Zp3,t+1
]
(30)
Δp1,t = (1− λp) (πt )1−p(1+kp) + λpΔp1,t−1
(
πt+1
π
γp
t π¯
1−γp
)p(1+kp)−1
(31)
1 =
1
1 + kp
Δ
1/(1−p(1+kp))
p1,t +
kp
1 + kp
Δp2,t (32)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1805
Δp2,t = (1− λp) πt + λpΔp2,t−1
(
πt+1
π
γp
t π¯
1−γp
)−1
(33)
Δp3,t =
1
1 + kp
Δ
p(1+kp)/(1−p(1+kp))
p1,t Δp4,t +
kp
1 + kp
(34)
Δp4,t = (1− λp) (πt )−p(1+kp) + λpΔp4,t−1
(
πt+1
π
γp
t π¯
1−γp
)p(1+kp)
(35)
AtK
α
t−1
(
Lt
Δp3,t
)1−α
= Δp3,tyt (36)
1− τp,t = εp,t (37)
Labor sector
wt =
w (1 + kw)
w (1 + kw)− 1
Zw1,t
Zw2,t
+
kw
w − 1 (w

t )
1+p(1+kp) Zw3,t
Zw2,t
(38)
Zw1,t = ε
B
t L¯L
1+σL
t w
w(1+kw)
t (Ct − ιCt−1)1−σc exp
(
L¯
σc − 1
1 + σl
L1+σLt
)
Δ
w(1+kw)/(1−w(1+kw))
w1,t (39)
+βλwEt
[(
πt+1
πγwt π¯
1−γw
)w(1+kw)
Zw1,t
]
Zw2,t = (1−τw,t)ΛtLt
[
wtΔ
1/(1−w(1+kw))
w1,t
]w(1+kw)
+βλwEt
[(
πt+1
πγwt π¯
1−γw
)w(1+kw)−1
Zw2,t+1
]
(40)
Zw3,t = (1− τw,t)ΛtLt + βλwEt
[(
πt+1
π
γp
t π¯
1−γp
)−1
Zw3,t+1
]
(41)
Δw1,t = (1− λw)
(
wt
wt
)1−w(1+kw)
+λwΔw1,t−1
(
wt−1
wt
)1−w(1+kw)( πt+1
πγwt π¯
1−γw
)w(1+kw)−1
(42)
1 =
1
1 + kw
Δ
1/(1−w(1+kw))
w1,t +
kw
1 + kw
Δw2,t (43)
Δw2,t = (1− λw)
(
wt
wt
)
+ λwΔw2,t−1
(
wt
wt−1
πt+1
πγwt π¯
1−γw
)−1
(44)
Δw3,t =
1
1 + kw
Δ
w(1+kw)/(1−w(1+kw))
w1,t Δw4,t +
kw
1 + kw
(45)
Δw4,t = (1− λw)
(
wt
wt
)−w(1+kw)
+ λwΔw4,t−1
(
wt
wt−1
πt+1
πγwt π¯
1−γw
)w(1+kw)
(46)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1805
1− τw,t = εw,t (47)
Government
Rt − R¯ = φππt+s
π¯
+ φy
yt+s
y¯
+ φk
kt+s
k¯
+ ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
(48)
Capital producer
Kt = qt
(
ω1 − ω2
2
qt
)
ot + (1− qt)θ (49)
ot = o
new
t + (1− δ)Kt−1
onewt = ε
I
T it
(
1− κ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2)
(51)
Qtε
I
t
[
1− S
(
it
it−1
)
− S ′
(
it
it−1
)
it
it−1
]
−1 = βEt
[
Λt+1
Λt
εIt+1Qt+1S
′
(
it+1
it
)(
it+1
it
)2]
.
(52)
Bank
qt = 1− R˜
ψ˜t
+
√
ω2
(
R˜t − ψ˜t
)
(R˜t + 2ξ˜t)
(
2ω1ψ˜t
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
+ ω2
(
R˜t − ψ˜t
)
(R˜t + 2ξ˜t)
)
ω2ψ˜t(R˜t + 2ξ˜t)
(53)
kt =
R˜t − ψ˜t
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
(54)
(
ω1 − ω2
2
qt−1
) rk,t + (1− δ)Qt − τ:t
Qt−1
− rd,t
πt+1
(1− kt)− re,t+1
πt+1
kt = 0 (55)
τt =
Qt−1
1−qt−1
qt−1
(
ψ − θ rk,t+(1−δ)Qt
Qt−1
)
ω1 − ω22 qt−1
(56)
ξ˜t = ξtEt [Λt+1] (57)
ξt = ξε
ξ
t (58)
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R˜t = Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
(59)
ψ˜t = ψEt [Λt+1] (60)
otQt = et + dt (61)
kt = et/ (et + dt) (62)
Shock processes
log
(
εBt
)
= ρP log
(
εBt−1
)
+ σBuBt (63)
log
(
εQt
)
= ρI log
(
εQt−1
)
+ σQuQt (64)
log
(
εξt
)
= ρξ log
(
εξt−1
)
+ σξuξt (65)
log
(
εPt
)
= ρP log
(
εPt−1
)
+ σP
(
uPt +mpu
P
t−1
)
(66)
log
(
εWt
)
= ρW log
(
εWt−1
)
+ σW
(
uWt +mWu
W
t−1
)
(67)
log
(
εAt
)
= ρA log
(
εAt−1
)
+ σAuAt (68)
log
(
εRt
)
= ρR log
(
εRt−1
)
+ σRuRt (69)
log
(
εGt
)
= ρG log
(
εGt−1
)
+ σGuGt + ρGAσ
AuAt (70)
Observational equations: The observation equations, linking the observed
time series (left hand-side) to the variables in the non-linear model (right hand-
side) are the following:
100Δ log
(
Yt
Yt−1
)
= 100Δ log
(
yt
yt−1
)
+ 100μy
100Δ log
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
= 100Δ log
(
ct
ct−1
)
+ 100μy
100Δ log
(
It
It−1
)
= 100Δ log
(
it
it−1
)
+ 100μy
100Δ log
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
= 100Δ log
(
wt
wt−1
)
+ 100μy
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100Δ log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= 100πt
100 log
(
Ht
H¯
)
= 100 log
(
Lt
L¯
)
+ 100μl
(
Rt
4
)
= 100R
E˜t = 100kt
where H¯ are hours worked in 2009 and μl is a shift parameter. Since there is no
growth in the model, we estimate the mean growth rate in the data μy. The equity
ratio in the data E˜t is transformed by taking deviations from its linear trend and
adding back the mean.
Prior specifications: We fix parameters that are not identified to values com-
monly used in the literature. In particular, we choose a depreciation rate δ of
0.025, a steady-state wage markup ε¯W of 1.05, a steady-state spending to GDP
ratio gy of 18%, a weight of labor in the utility function L¯ such that steady-state
hours are equal to 1, and curvatures of the Kimball aggregator for goods and labor
varieties of 10.
For all structural shocks, we employ a non-informative uniform distribution.
The persistences of the shock processes are assumed to have a beta prior distri-
bution centered at 0.5, and with standard deviation of 0.2. Following Smets and
Wouters (2007), we further assume that the two markup shows have a moving
average component.
The priors of the Taylor rule parameters are centered around very common
values: the smoothing parameter has a Beta distribution with a mean of 0.75, while
the responses to inflation and output are assumed to follow a Normal distribution
with a mean of 1.5 and of 0.5/4 = 0.125.
Since we use level data of the inflation rate and of the nominal interest rate, we
choose the priors for the steady state of the inflation rate π¯ and the real interest
rate 1/β− 1 to match the mean in the data, i.e. we assumed they follow a gamma
distribution respectively centered around annualized values of 2.5% and 0.9.
The parameters affecting price and wage stickiness have a beta distribution
centered at 0.5 with standard deviation of 0.1. Our prior is that prices and wages
are reoptimized on average every 6 months, and that the degree of indexation to
past inflation is only up to 50%. The steady-state price markup is assumed to be
centered around 1.25, slightly above the steady-state wage markup.
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We employ very common priors for all the parameters of the utility function.
Habits are centered around 0.7, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc has
a prior mean of 1.5, while the elasticity of labor supply σl has a prior mean of
2. The capital share in production has a prior mean of 0.3 while the investment
adjustment costs parameter has a loose prior around 4.
For the discussion on the priors for the banking sector parameters, we refer to
the main text.
Estimation The estimation was done in DYNARE. We verify that all estimated
parameters are separately identifiable. The mode is computed using csminwel.
Experiments with the computation of the mode did not reveal problems of multi-
modality. For the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm we set the scale parameter such
as to obtain a acceptance ratio of around 30% and use two parallel chains of length
2,000,000, which was found to be enough for convergence. The recovered shock
series are well behaved.
Appendix C: Proofs
The risk-taking channel for a generic expected return func-
tion
Consider the bank problem discussed in Section 2, but replace the expression
for the expected return conditional on success qt (ω1 − ω2/2qt) with the generic
function f(qt).
Assume there exists an equilibrium [r˜l,t, qt, kt] under perfect competition that
satisfies the following conditions: (1) the bank’s choices are interior, i.e. [kt,qt] ∈
[0, 1]2, (2a) the default probability is low relative to the parameters qt
(1−qt) ξ˜t ≥
R˜t − ψ˜t or (2b) there is no deposit insurance ψ˜t = 0, the conditional expected
return function f(qt) satisfies (3) f(qt) ≥ 0, f ′′(qt) < 0 and (4) f ′′′(qt) ≤ 0,
f ′′′′(qt) ≤ 0.
Note that assumption 2a), which is sufficient but by no means necessary and
only needed for claim (e), is weak if we consider the empirically relevant section
of the parameter space with a low equity premium (around 0.0x), a real rate
just above 1 (1.0x) and high level of deposit insurance (0.x) and high repayment
probabilities (0.9x). Assumption 3 is straightforward as it guarantees a meaningful
risk return trade-off with an interior solution. Assumption 4 is another sufficient
but non-necessary condition.
We prove that if such a solution exists, then:
(a) risk taking is excessive: qt < argmax f(qt) ,
(b) the safety of assets qt is a positive function of R˜t:
∂qt
∂R˜t
> 0,
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Table 4: Model estimation: prior and posterior values
parameter prior shape prior mean prior std post. mean 90% HPD interval
structural parameters
μy trend growth norm 0.4 0.1 0.4264 0.3908 0.4618
μl labor normalization norm 0 2 -0.0938 -1.6569 1.4777
α output share norm 0.3 0.05 0.2001 0.1602 0.2395
100 1−β
β
real rate in % norm 0.25 0.1 0.427 0.2992 0.5485
ε¯P price markup norm 1.25 0.12 1.5068 1.3621 1.6523
π¯ inflation in % gamma 0.62 0.1 0.6263 0.4893 0.7616
φπ TR weight on inflation norm 1.5 0.25 1.8723 1.5489 2.2003
φy TR weight on output norm 0.12 0.05 0.0198 -0.0348 0.0753
ρ TR persistence beta 0.75 0.1 0.8411 0.8057 0.8768
κ investment adj. costs norm 4 1.5 7.4584 5.5992 9.3376
ι habits norm 0.7 0.1 0.7774 0.7042 0.8532
σc risk aversion gamma 1.5 0.375 1.7362 1.2809 2.1939
σl disutility from labor gamma 2 0.75 2.0183 0.9726 3.0566
λp price calvo parameter beta 0.5 0.1 0.6206 0.5429 0.701
λw wage calvo parameter beta 0.5 0.1 0.8476 0.8099 0.8864
γp price indexation beta 0.5 0.15 0.1533 0.0537 0.2479
γw wage indexation beta 0.5 0.15 0.448 0.2066 0.6829
ξ equity premium norm 0.015 0.01 0.0213 0.0054 0.0348
θ liquidation value norm 0.5 0.1 0.7416 0.6425 0.8385
k¯ equity ratio norm 0.12 0.05 0.1231 0.1208 0.1254
structural shock processes
σA stdev TFP unif 0 10 0.3665 0.3172 0.414
σB stdev preference unif 0 10 3.4696 2.2271 4.6946
σG stdev govt. spending unif 0 10 2.2678 1.984 2.5382
σI stdev investment unif 0 10 4.7269 3.0495 6.3757
σP stdev price markup unif 0 1 0.1332 0.109 0.1574
σR stdev monetary unif 0 1 0.1164 0.1009 0.1315
σW stdev wage markup unif 0 10 0.4742 0.4088 0.5389
σξ stdev equity premium unif 0 10 0.5805 0.199 1.0255
ρA persistence TFP beta 0.5 0.2 0.4623 0.3496 0.5765
ρB persistence preference beta 0.5 0.2 0.9004 0.8549 0.9486
ρG persistence gov.
spending
beta 0.5 0.2 0.9009 0.8471 0.9556
ρI persistence investment beta 0.5 0.2 0.1924 0.0357 0.3396
ρP persistence price markup beta 0.5 0.2 0.9772 0.9625 0.9925
ρR persistence monetary beta 0.5 0.2 0.9585 0.918 0.9967
ρW persistence wage markup beta 0.5 0.2 0.7721 0.6706 0.8734
ρξ persistence equity
premium
beta 0.5 0.2 0.8156 0.7623 0.8699
ρG,A correlation gov.
spending & TFP
beta 0.5 0.2 0.6513 0.3835 0.9394
mp MA component of price
markup
beta 0.5 0.2 0.7765 0.6826 0.875
mw MA component of wage
markup
beta 0.5 0.2 0.9741 0.9516 0.9972
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(c) the equity ratio kt is a positive function of R˜t:
∂kt
∂R˜t
> 0,
(d) the expected return on investment is a positive function of R˜t:
∂f(qt(R˜t))+(1−qt(R˜t))θ
∂R˜t
>
0,
(e) the expected return on investment is a concave function of R˜t:
∂2f(qt(R˜t))+(1−qt(R˜t))θ
∂R˜2t
<
0.
For a generic return function f(qt) the bank’s objective function at the second
stage is:
max
qt
f (qt) r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)
Deriving this problem with respect to qt yields the following first-order condition,
which by concavity is necessary and sufficient:
f ′(qt)r˜l,t = r˜d,t(1− kt) (71)
Notice that this condition implies f ′(qt) > 0 (kt ∈ (0, 1] by assumption, r˜d,t > 0
by the deposit supply schedule, and r˜l,t > 0 by the zero-profit condition). Notice
further that in a frictionless world, e.g. without limited liability, the bank’s risk
choice would satisfy qoptt = argmax f(qt) + (1 − qt)θ, i.e. f ′(qoptt ) = θ. Since we
have assumed above that the recovery value is smaller than the deposit insurance
cap, which in turn is smaller than the cost of deposits by lemma 1, we have:
r˜l,tθ < ψ˜t < r˜d,t(1 − kt). Combining this with equation (71) and the frictionless
optimality condition and rearranging, we obtain f ′(qt) > f ′(q
opt
t ). Given f
′′(qt) < 0
this implies excessive risk taking, i.e. qt < q
opt
t (claim(a)).
Since the deposit supply schedule must hold in equilibrium, we can rewrite this
condition as:
f ′(qt)r˜l,t − R˜t(1−kt)+(1−qt)ψ˜tqt = 0 (72)
Equation (72) implicitly defines qˆt(kt). Using the implicit function theorem we
find that, f ′(qoptt ) = θ < r˜d,t(1− kt) = f ′(qt)r˜l,t
∂qt
∂kt
= −qtR˜t
(1−kt)R˜t−ψ˜t+q2t r˜l,tf ′′(qt)
At the first stage the maximization problem is:
max
kt
f (qt) r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)− qtktr˜e,t .
which, using the deposit and equity supply schedules r˜d,t =
R˜t− 1−qt1−kt ψ˜t
qt
r˜e,t =
R˜t+ξ˜t
qt
,
can be written as:
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maxkt f (qˆt) r˜l,t + (1− qt)ψ˜t − ktξ˜t − R˜t .
The corresponding FOC is:
(
f ′ (qˆt) r˜l,t − ψ˜t
)
∂qt
∂kt
− ξ˜t . (73)
Finally, the zero-profit condition can in expectations be written as:
f (qˆt) r˜l,t + (1− qt)ψ˜t − ktξ˜t − R˜t . (74)
Equations (72), (73), (74) implicitly define qt, kt and r˜l,t. Solving the latter
two equations for kt and r˜l,t we obtain:
kt =
(−ξ˜tR˜t+qtR˜tψ˜t+ξ˜tψ˜t)f(qt)−qt(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))
−ξ˜t(R˜tf(qt)−qt(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))) (75)
r˜l,t =
(R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)
R˜tf(qt)−qt(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt)) (76)
Plugging these equations into (72) and rearranging, we obtain the following equa-
tion, which implicitly defines qt:
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
R˜tψ˜tf(qt)−(R˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)−((1−qt)R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t)f ′(qt)−qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)f ′′(qt)
−ξ˜t(R˜tf(qt)−qt(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))) = 0
We can simplify this condition further by multiplying by the denominator and
dividing by
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
R˜t:
F (qt, Rt) ≡ R˜tψ˜tf(qt)−(R˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)−((1−qt)R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t)f
′(qt)−qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)f ′′(qt)
R˜t
= 0 (77)
Using the implicit function theorem on equation (77), we find that :
∂qt
∂Rt
= −
∂F
∂Rt
∂F
∂qt
(78)
where
∂F
∂Rt
=
(R˜2t+ξ˜tψ˜t)f ′(qt)+(1−qt)qtξ˜tψ˜tf ′′(qt)
−R˜2t
∂F
∂qt
=
(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)((R˜t+2ξ˜t)f ′′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′′(qt))
−R˜t
Using our assumptions on f , the parameters and assuming an interior solution,
it is obvious that ∂F
∂qt
> 0. How about the ∂F
∂Rt
?
To get the sign of ∂F
∂Rt
, we solve 77 for f(qt):
f(qt) =
(R˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)−((1−qt)R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)f ′′(qt)
R˜tψ˜t
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Using our assumptions on f , the parameters and assuming an interior solution,
it is obvious that ∂F
∂qt
> 0. How about the ∂F
∂Rt
?
To get the sign of ∂F
∂Rt
, we solve 77 for f(qt):
f(qt) =
(R˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)−((1−qt)R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)f ′′(qt)
R˜tψ˜t
and plug this expression into the equations (75) and (76) for kt and r˜l,t:
kt =
f ′(qt)(R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)+f ′′(qt)qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)
R˜t((R˜t+ξ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))
2 (79)
r˜l,t =
(R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t
(R˜t+ξ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt)
(80)
Since in equilibrium r˜l,t > 0 and since the numerator of r˜l,t is positive, it must
hold that its denominator is also positive:(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
f ′(qt) + qtξ˜tf ′′(qt) > 0 (81)
Similarly, since kt > 0 and since the denominator of kt is positive, the numerator
must be positive too:
f ′(qt)(R˜t + ξ˜t)(R˜t − ψ˜t) + f ′′(qt)qtξ˜t(R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t > 0 (82)
Since f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0 we can conclude from the previous inequality that for any
[x1, x2] ∈ R2 it must hold that f ′(qt)x1 + f ′′(qt)x2 > 0 if
x1
x2
≥ (R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)
qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t) . (83)
We now test this condition for the numerator of ∂F
∂Rt
:
R˜2t+ξ˜tψ˜t
(1−qt)qtξ˜tψ˜t ≶
(R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)
qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t) .
Rearranging, multiplying only by positive values, yields:
0 ≶ −R˜t(R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t)− qtψ˜tξ˜t −
(
R˜t(1− qt)ψ˜t + (1− qt)ψ˜tξ˜t
)
qtψ˜t
(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)
The RHS is obviously negative since from the proposition that every deposit
insurance cap will be exceeded, it follows that R˜t > ψ˜t. Hence the condition
R˜2t+ξ˜tψ˜t
(1−qt)qtξ˜tψ˜t ≥
R˜t+ξ˜t
qtξ˜t
is satisfied and we can conclude that the numerator of ∂F
∂Rt
is
positive. Hence ∂F
∂Rt
< 0 and therefore ∂qt
∂Rt
> 0 (claim (b)).
Equation (79) defines kt = K(qt, R˜t). Its derivative is given by
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∂kt
∂R˜t
=
∂K
∂R˜t
+
∂K
∂qt
∂qt
∂R˜t
where
∂K
∂R˜t
=
((f ′(qt))2R˜2t+2f ′(qt)(f ′(qt)+f ′′(qt)(1−qt)qt)R˜tξ˜t+(f ′(qt)+f ′′(qt)qt)(f ′(qt)−f ′′(qt)(1−qt)qt)ξ˜2t )ψ˜t
R˜2t(f ′′qξ˜t+f ′(R˜t+ξ˜t))
2
∂K
∂qt
=
qtξ˜tf ′′(qt)ψ˜t(2(R˜t+ξ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))
R˜t(f ′′qξ˜t+f ′(R˜t+ξ˜t))
2
From (83) it is immediately obvious that the numerator of ∂K
∂qt
is negative, hence
∂K
∂qt
< 0. After division by ψ˜t, the numerator of
∂K
∂R˜t
can be rewritten as:
((
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
f ′(qt) + qtξ˜tf ′′(qt)
)2
− (f ′′(qt))2 q3t ξ˜2t − f ′′(qt)f ′(qt)q2t ξ˜t(2R˜t + ξ˜t)
Since the first term is positive and larger than the absolute value of the second
term we can see that ∂K
∂R˜t
> 0. Hence we have shown that ∂kt
∂R˜t
> 0 (claim (c)).
Applying the implicit function theorem a second time on equation (77), we can
find the following expression for the second derivative of qt:
∂2qt
∂R˜2t
=
(
∂2F
∂Rt∂qt
+ ∂
2F
∂q2t
∂qt
∂Rt
)
∂F
∂Rt
−
(
∂2F
∂Rt∂qt
∂qt
∂Rt
+ ∂
2F
∂R2t
)
∂F
∂qt(
∂F
∂qt
)2 (84)
where:
∂2F
∂R˜t∂qt
=
(
R˜2t + 2(1− qt)ξ˜tψ˜t
)
f ′′(qt) + qt(1− qt)ξ˜tψ˜tf ′′′(qt)
−R˜t
∂2F
∂q2t
=
ψ˜t
(
qtξ˜tf
′′′(qt) +
(
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
)
f ′′(qt)
)
+
(
f ′′′′(qt)qtξ˜t + f ′′′(qt)
(
R˜t + 3ξ˜t
))(
R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t
)
−R˜t
∂2F
∂R2t
=
2 (f ′(qt) + f ′′(qt)(1− q)q) ξ˜tψ˜t
R˜3t
since f ′′ < 0 and f ′′′ ≤ 0 f ′′′′ ≤ 0 and all parameters are positive, it is obvious
that ∂
2F
∂Rt∂qt
> 0 and ∂
2F
∂q2t
> 0. The term∂
2F
∂R2t
is less straightforward. A sufficient
condition for ∂
2F
∂R2t
> 0 can be found using condition (83):
1
(1− qt)qt ≥
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)(
R˜t − ψ˜t
)
qtξ˜t
(
R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t
)
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which simplifies to:
qt
(1− qt) ξ˜t ≥ R˜t − ψ˜t
Given the signs of the terms in (84) we have finally verified that:
∂2qt
∂R˜2t
=
((+) + (+) (+)) (−)− ((+) (+) + (+)) (+)
(+)
< 0
Under alternative assumption (2b) the expression for ∂
2qt
∂R˜2t
simplifies to:
∂2qt
∂R˜2t
= −f
′(qt)(−2f ′′(qt)f ′′′(qt)qtξ˜t−2(f ′′(qt))2(R˜t+2ξ˜t)+f ′(qt)(f ′′′′(qt)qtξ˜t+f ′′′(qt)(R˜t+3ξ˜t)))
(f ′′′(qt)ξ˜t+f ′′(qt)(R˜t+2ξ˜t))
3
which is negative without further conditions.
Using the signs of the derivatives of qt and the fact that f
′(qt) > f ′(q
opt
t ) = θ,
we can finally determine the slope and curvature of the expected return on the
bank’s investment.
∂[f(qt)+(1−(qt))θ]
∂R˜t
= (f ′(qt)− θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂qt
∂R˜t︸︷︷︸
+
> 0
∂2[f(qt)+(1−(qt))θ]
∂R˜2t
= (f ′(qt)− θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂2qt
∂R˜2t︸︷︷︸
+
+ f ′′(qt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂qt
∂R˜t︸︷︷︸
+
< 0
This completes the proof of claims (d) and (e).
Notice that the quadratic functional form we assumed for f(qt) in the model
Section satisfies assumptions (3) and (4) and we focused on interior solutions
(assumption (1)). Therefore claims (1), (2), (3) and (4) in propositions 1 and
2 hold. Furthermore, claim (5) in proposition 1 holds since assumption (2a) is
satisfied. Finally, to see that claim (5) in proposition 2.1 holds independent of
assumption (2a) and (2b), consider the solution for qt
qt = 1− R˜ψ˜t +
√
ω2(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t)(2ω1ψ˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)+ω2(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t))
ω2ψ˜t(R˜t+2ξ˜t)
The second derivative of this expression is:
∂2q
∂R˜2t
= −
ω1ω2
{
2ω2
(
R˜t − ψ˜t
)3
ξ˜t
(
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
)
+ ω1ψ˜t...
...
[
R˜4t + 2R˜t
(
4R˜2t − 3R˜tψ˜t + 2ψ˜t
2
ξ˜t
)
+
(
12R˜t − 4R˜tψ˜t + 5ψ˜t2
)
ξ˜2t + 8R˜t +
˜4ψtξ˜
3
t + 16ξ˜
4
t
]}
(R˜t+2ξ˜t){ω2(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t)[2ω1ψ˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)+b(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t)]}2/3
Both the numerator and denominator are positive, so ∂
2q
∂R˜2t
< 0. Hence ∂
2[f(qt)+(1−(qt))θ]
∂R˜2t
<
0. 
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Deposits in excess of insurance
The proof is by contradiction: Assume that there exists an equilibrium with no
excess profits where the bank would issue so little deposits that the promised
repayment rd,t would be lower than the cap on deposit insurance ψ/(1− kt)πt+1.61
In this case the deposit rate rd,t would be equal to the risk-free rate Rt.
The second-stage maximization problem of the bank would then be:
max
qt∈[0,1]
f(qt)r˜l − qtR˜t(1− kt)
and its solution qˆt is implied by f
′(qt)r˜l = R˜t(1 − kt). The first-stage maxi-
mization problem is:
max
kt∈[0,1]
V (k) = f(qˆt)r˜l − qˆR˜t(1− kt)− (ξ˜t + R˜t)kt
qˆt can either be a corner or an interior solution. If qˆt is a corner solution,
the first-stage objective function of the bank is obviously decreasing in kt, hence
kt = 0 is optimal. If qˆt is an interior solution, the first derivative of the first-stage
objective function is:
−ξ˜t − R˜t(1− qˆt)
Since qˆt ∈ [0, 1], this derivative is negative for all kt ∈ [0, 1], i.e. the objective
function is again decreasing in k. Hence the solution to the first-stage problem
is kt = 0. Optimality with full insurance therefore requires the bank to use only
deposits. This contradicts our initial assumption. This result implies that any
insurance cap smaller than 100% would be exceeded by the deposit liabilities in
case of default. Depositors are therefore never fully insured.
Notice that for a cap to be effective in the sense of ruling out full insurance
equilibria, the cap has to be low enough. Formally speaking, it needs to hold that
rd,t(1− kt) > ψ˜t even under full insurance, i.e. R˜t > ψ˜t.
61For simplicity, we abstract from the possibility that the cap is binding for some states of the
future but not for others, which would be possible due to the inconsistency between the timing
of inflation and the nominal deposit rate. Note that this distinction disappears under certainty
equivalence or first-order approximation.
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Appendix D: Additional Tables
These two tables reproduce tables 1 and 2. However, here we estimated the pa-
rameters for each model separately. I.e. the parameters of the two models differ
and are chosen to fit each model to the same data. In the main text we used the
parameters estimated for the bank model for both models.
Table 5: Optimal simple rules: The first (second) column describes the timing (restrictions)
of the policy rule. The last row corresponds to a rule where only φk can be chosen and the other
parameters are fixed to the optimized benchmark values. V is the welfare level associated with
each policy in the bank model. Ω is the welfare cost (in % of the consumption stream) associated
with implementing in the bank model the optimal policy rule of the benchmark model. For the
benchmark model the restriction φk = 0 is irrelevant, since the equity ratio is constant. Italics
indicate restricted parameters. Notice that columns 6-10 (apart from the last line) are identical
to Table 1.
benchmark model bank model
s rule ρ φπt+s φyt+s ρ φπt+s φyt+s φkt V Ω
0 φk, ρ = 0 0 8.088 0.117 0 3.080 0.126 0 -185.321 0.658
0 φk = 0 0.000 8.088 0.117 1.059 0.510 0.005 0 -184.750 1.081
0 ρ = 0 0 8.088 0.117 0 2.637 0.097 0.027 -185.314 0.663
1 φk, ρ = 0 0 23.070 0.101 0 4.294 0.172 0 -185.209 1.093
1 φk = 0 0.213 17.463 0.101 1.114 0.072 0.074 0 -184.656 1.176
0 choose φk 0.000 8.088 0.117 0 8.088 0.117 -0.177 -185.453 0.560
Table 6: Differences in moments associated with the optimal simple rules in the
benchmark and in the bank model: This Table shows the % differences in the mean and
standard deviation associated with applying the different optimal rules in the bank model. The
first entry, for example, indicates that under the optimal bank policy rule average risk would be
0.195% lower than if the rule optimal for the benchmark model had been applied.
mean standard deviation
s rule q Rr π y c f(q) q Rr π y c
0 φk, ρ = 0 0.195 0.002 -0.055 0.421 0.675 0.029 -49.028 -53.046 59.080 -0.827 -4.757
0 φk = 0 0.259 0.007 -0.042 0.549 0.877 0.037 -70.888 -79.928 71.518 -9.531 -10.178
0 ρ = 0 0.196 0.003 -0.018 0.433 0.681 0.029 -47.016 -52.390 59.835 -0.758 -4.451
1 φk, ρ = 0 0.288 0.004 -0.058 0.709 1.121 0.043 -58.084 -62.584 66.898 -3.715 -9.184
1 φk = 0 0.197 0.005 0.003 0.466 0.729 0.028 -71.851 -80.764 83.557 -11.209 -13.993
0 choose φk 0.174 0.001 -0.073 0.354 0.592 0.027 -47.041 -47.289 37.745 3.603 -0.807
This Table reproduces Table 2. However here we show the differences of the
moments for each model assuming that in each model the central bank follows the
respective optimal simple rule.
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Table 7: Differences in moments associated with the optimal simple rules in the
benchmark and in the bank model: This Table shows the % differences in the mean and
standard deviation associated with applying the respective optimal simple rules in the benchmark
and the bank model. The first entry, for example, indicates that under the optimal simple policy
rule average risk is 0.15% lower in the bank model then in the benchmark model.
mean standard deviation
s rule q Rr π y c f(q) q Rr π y c
0 φk, ρ = 0 0.196 0.003 -0.018 0.433 0.681 0.029 -47.016 -52.390 59.835 -0.758 -4.451
0 φk = 0 0.259 0.007 -0.042 0.549 0.877 0.037 -70.888 -79.928 71.518 -9.531 -10.178
0 ρ = 0 0.195 0.002 -0.055 0.421 0.675 0.029 -49.028 -53.046 59.080 -0.827 -4.757
1 φk, ρ = 0 0.288 0.004 -0.058 0.709 1.121 0.043 -58.084 -62.584 66.898 -3.715 -9.184
1 φk = 0 0.197 0.005 0.003 0.466 0.729 0.028 -43.982 -47.986 33.801 1.927 -2.492
0 choose φk 0.174 0.001 -0.073 0.354 0.592 0.027 -47.039 -47.606 37.552 3.339 -1.019
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